China
China’s vetoes during the Syrian conflict
Author: Rosemary Foot, Oxford
With the internationalised civil war in Syria entering its ninth year, the north-western part of the country is experiencing ‘massive waves of civilian displacement and major loss of civilian life’, induced by Russian-backed Syrian government air and ground strikes against rebel forces.
Such devastation has been a regular feature of this conflict. Yet China, with Russia in the lead, has on eight occasions used its UN Security Council veto at key moments of the war. Indeed, Russia has used its veto on several additional occasions as it seeks to ensure that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad remains in power. But use of the veto is unusual behaviour for Beijing. Prior to the outbreak of fighting in Syria in 2011, Beijing had only used its veto six times since it took its UN seat in 1971. Surprisingly, Beijing has persisted despite attracting very little support from the other 13 members of the Security Council.
The latest veto came in December 2019 when both Beijing and Moscow voted against a resolution designed to allow humanitarian agencies continued access to besieged populations through four previously-agreed border crossings. In Beijing’s view, the agencies needed to coordinate with the Syrian government rather than deliver assistance directly to the populations in need. The resolution, drawn up by non-permanent members of the Security Council, Belgium, Germany and Kuwait, sought to re-authorise the cross-border transfer of humanitarian goods such as medicines and surgical supplies for one year. But just two crossing points were mandated for six months (from January 2020) after extended bargaining by Russia.
Beijing’s recent voting patterns have carried social costs for the Chinese government, particularly in the war’s early stages. In February 2012, Beijing and Moscow both vetoed a Security Council resolution that was expected to pass unanimously after significant revisions had taken into account Chinese and Russian objections. That resolution demanded that all parties in Syria stop all violence and reprisals, while Beijing’s ambassador argued that its passage would undermine prospects for political dialogue with Syrian authorities. China’s veto attracted domestic criticism. It also attracted criticism from then UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon and various Middle Eastern states, 10 of whom had co-sponsored the resolution.
Why has Beijing decided on this course of action? Keeping Bashar al-Assad in power and ensuring the territorial integrity of Syria remain key Chinese objectives. Following the 2011 UN intervention in Libya — which saw the overthrow and eventual killing of its leader Muammar Gaddafi — China perceived the threat of external intervention designed to force regime change in relation to any government attempting to deal with domestic unrest as having gained in strength.
In the Middle East, such forms of external intervention are also seen as generating conditions enabling the rise of Islamist extremism. China’s fear of ethnic Uyghurs joining jihadist organisations in Syria has grown over the course of the war, with Beijing now justifying its draconian and counter-productive policies in Xinjiang as a response to that fear. A Global Times editorial claims that it was only through the strong leadership of the Chinese Communist Party that Xinjiang managed to ‘avoid the fate of becoming “China’s Syria”, or “China’s Libya”’.
China and Russia have also decided to strike a bargain, and more frequently than in the past, to operate as a ‘P2’ within the UN Security Council by supporting each other on issues of core concern. This is happening at a time when a usually dominant ‘P3’ of Britain, France and the United States find their own relations fraying over a range of matters, including developments connected with Mali, Israel–Palestine and Iran.
Beijing now believes that it can more easily deflect criticism of its more outspoken stance. Such boldness is a result of China’s increased global economic and political influence. But to mitigate criticism of its vetoes from Middle Eastern states, Beijing stepped up its regional engagement by launching its first ‘Arab Policy Paper’ in 2016 and Chinese President Xi Jinping visited several countries in the region.
China has since worked to cement economic ties through the Belt and Road Initiative, infrastructure investment and trade. Through diplomacy, Beijing reminds a generally sympathetic audience of the devastating consequences of western-led military interventions in Iraq and…
China
New Publication: A Guide for Foreign Investors on Navigating China’s New Company Law
The sixth revision of China’s Company Law is the most extensive amendment in history, impacting foreign invested enterprises with stricter rules on capital injection and corporate governance. Most FIEs must align with the New Company Law by July 1, 2024, with a deadline of December 31, 2024 for adjustments. Contact Dezan Shira & Associates for assistance.
The sixth revision of China’s Company Law represents the most extensive amendment in its history. From stricter capital injection rules to enhanced corporate governance, the changes introduced in the New Company Law have far-reaching implications for businesses, including foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) operating in or entering the China market.
Since January 1, 2020, the Company Law has governed both wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs) and joint ventures (JVs), following the enactment of the Foreign Investment Law (FIL). Most FIEs must align with the provisions of the New Company Law from July 1, 2024, while those established before January 1, 2020 have bit more time for adjustments due to the five-year grace period provided by the FIL. The final deadline for their alignment is December 31, 2024.
In this publication, we guide foreign investors through the implications of the New Company Law for existing and new FIEs and relevant stakeholders. We begin with an overview of the revision’s background and objectives, followed by a summary of key changes. Our in-depth analysis, from a foreign stakeholder perspective, illuminates the practical implications. Lastly, we explore tax impacts alongside the revisions, demonstrating how the New Company Law may shape future business transactions and arrangements.
If you or your company require assistance with Company Law adjustments in China, please do not hesitate to contact Dezan Shira & Associates. For more information, feel free to reach us via email at china@dezshira.com.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
Lingang New Area in Shanghai Opens First Cross-Border Data Service Center to Streamline Data Export Process
The Lingang New Area in Shanghai has launched China’s first Cross-Border Data Service Center to facilitate data export for companies in Shanghai. The center will help with applications, data catalogs, and management, aiming to provide legal and safe cross-border data transfer mechanisms.
The Lingang New Area in Shanghai’s Pilot Free Trade Zone has launched a new cross-border data service center to provide administrative and consulting services to companies in Shanghai that need to export data out of China. The service center will help facilitate data export by accepting applications from companies for data export projects and is tasked with formulating and implementing data catalogs to facilitate data export in the area. The Shanghai cross-border data service center will provide services to companies across the whole city.
The Lingang New Area in the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone has launched China’s first Cross-Border Data Service Center (the “service center”). The service center, which is jointly operated by the Cybersecurity Administration of China (CAC) and the local government, aims to further facilitate legal, safe, and convenient cross-border data transfer (CBDT) mechanisms for companies.
The service center will not only serve companies in the Lingang New Area but is also open to companies across Shanghai, and will act as an administrative service center specializing in CBDT.
In January 2024, the local government showcased a set of trial measures for the “classified and hierarchical” management of CBDT in the Lingang New Area. The measures, which have not yet been released to the public, seek to facilitate CBDT from the area by dividing data for cross-border transfer into three different risk categories: core, important, and general data.
The local government also pledged to release two data catalogs: a “general data” catalog, which will include types of data that can be transferred freely out of the Lingang New Area, and an “important data” catalog, which will be subject to restrictions. According to Zong Liang, an evaluation expert at the service center, the first draft of the general data catalog has been completed and is being submitted to the relevant superior departments for review.
In March 2024, the CAC released the final version of a set of regulations significantly facilitating CBDT for companies in the country. The new regulations increase the limits on the volume of PI that a company can handle before it is required to undergo additional compliance procedures, provide exemptions from the compliance procedures, and clarify the handling of important data.
Also in March, China released a new set of technical standards stipulating the rules for classifying three different types of data – core, important, and general data. Importantly, the standards provide guidelines for regulators and companies to identify what is considered “important” data. This means they will act as a reference for companies and regulators when assessing the types of data that can be exported, including FTZs such as the Lingang New Area.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
A Concise Guide to the Verification Letter of Invitation Requirement in the China Visa Process
The application procedures for business visas to China have been simplified, with most foreigners now able to apply for an M/F visa using only an invitation letter from a Chinese company. Some countries are eligible for visa-free entry. However, a Verification Letter of Invitation may still be needed in certain cases. Consult the local Chinese embassy for confirmation.
In light of recent developments, the application procedures for business visas to China have undergone substantial simplification. Most foreigners can now apply for an M/F visa using only the invitation letter issued by a Chinese company. Additionally, citizens of certain countries are eligible to enter China without a visa and stay for up to 144 hours or even 15 days.
However, it’s important to note that some applicants may still need to apply for a “Verification Letter of Invitation (邀请核实单)” when applying for an M/F visa to China. In this article, we will introduce what a Verification Letter of Invitation is, who needs to apply for it, and the potential risks.
It’s important to note that in most cases, the invitation letter provided by the inviting unit (whether a public entity or a company) is sufficient for M/F visa applications. The Verification Letter for Invitation is only required when the Chinese embassies or consulates in certain countries specifically ask for the document.
Meanwhile, it is also essential to note that obtaining a Verification Letter for Invitation does not guarantee visa approval. The final decision on granting a visa rests with the Chinese embassy abroad, based on the specific circumstances of the applicant.
Based on current information, foreign applicants in Sri Lanka and most Middle East countries – such as Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan, and so on – need to submit a Verification Letter for Invitation when they apply for a visa to China.
That said, a Verification Letter for Invitation might not be required in a few Middle East countries, such as Saudi Arabia. Therefore, we suggest that foreign applicants consult with their the local Chinese embassy or consulate to confirm in advance.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
- New Publication: A Guide for Foreign Investors on Navigating China’s New Company Law
- Lingang New Area in Shanghai Opens First Cross-Border Data Service Center to Streamline Data Export Process
- A Concise Guide to the Verification Letter of Invitation Requirement in the China Visa Process
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