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China

Trump’s trade deal poses new dangers to Southeast Asia

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Author: Calvin Cheng, ISIS Malaysia

After two years of alternating between tense escalation and fleeting periods of calm, the United States and China reached a preliminary phase one trade deal in December 2019. Government spokespersons in both countries promptly cheered the signing of the agreement — but observers around the world remain a little more circumspect.

The primary achievement of the phase one deal seemed to be tempering the uncertainty of further tariff escalation, with both sides agreeing to cancel their upcoming tariff hikes. But it ultimately does very little to improve things in the immediate term. The agreement did not remove existing tariffs on more than US$500 billion of US–China bilateral trade.

Discussions on the thorniest issues like state subsidies have been put off and left to a future ‘phase two’ agreement. Trade watchers also raise concerns about the purchase component of the deal that requires China to buy US$200 billion more US products over the next two years. The full text of the agreement specifically lists approximately 549 products at the HS 4-digit level for China to buy from the United States — covering agriculture, manufacturing and energy-related products.

Some of these concerns revolve around the ability of China to make good on its commitments to increase purchases from the United States amid lofty US purchase targets and rising risks to Chinese economic growth. But perhaps the more serious concern lies in the United States’ shift towards managed trade. Forcibly tying Chinese import requirements to the trade deal risks violating global trading rules, distorting and diverting world trade.

And here lies the crux of the problem. This kind of distortion and diversion threatens to create a new source of gloom for exporters in Southeast Asia, as China’s increase in US goods imports will likely come at the expense of other countries in the region.

Recent analysis suggests that agriculture exporters like Brazil, the European Union, Australia and New Zealand may see declines in Chinese agriculture demand as it buys more US produce. Similarly, non-US sources of manufactured goods like the European Union, Japan and South Korea may also be affected, while the energy-related products on the list would likely affect commodity exporters in the Gulf as well as Australia.

Countries in the Southeast Asian region may not be spared. Of the main exporting economies in the region, ISIS Malaysia estimates suggest that Malaysia remains the country with the highest exposure. US$52.7 billion worth — about 83 per cent — of Malaysian exports to China are of products similar to the 549 products listed in the phase one purchase agreement and thus at risk of losing market share to US producers.

Separated into broad product classes, Malaysian exports of four categories could be the most vulnerable — electronics and electrical parts and equipment; food and beverage-related products; industrial chemicals and metals; and energy-related products like petroleum and palm oil.

Looking deeper into specific product types — and filtering for products the United States has a sizeable market share of — the data indicates that Malaysia’s exports of chemicals compounds such as rare-earth metals, organo-sulphur compounds, ethyl alcohol and acids appear particularly susceptible. Food-related products like vegetable oils, cocoa and coffee products and sugar confectionery also appear to be at risk.

The Philippines and Singapore are the next most-exposed economies in Southeast Asia, with 82 per cent and 66 per cent of exports to China affected by the phase one purchase agreement, respectively. In the Philippines, at-risk products are primarily in agricultural commodities like coconut products, fruit and nuts. In Singapore, at-risk products span refrigerators and disk drives, industrial chemicals like phenols, petroleum oils and organic compounds.

Vietnam and Thailand are relatively less exposed, with less than 65 per cent of exports to China affected by the purchase agreement in the phase one deal. Still, Vietnamese exporters of cereals, vegetable and fish products should be wary, as should Thai exporters of industrial chemicals and vegetable products.

While this phase one deal does ease anxieties surrounding further trade escalations between the United States and China, it also brings new risks and fresh unknowns. In any case, trade protectionism and tariffs have become the new normal.

Since the beginning of the year alone, US President Donald Trump has broadened Section 232 national…

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Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister, will visit Australia to discuss trade and technology.

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China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, will visit New Zealand and Australia from March 17 to March 21, 2024, following invitations from both countries. The visit will include discussions on various bilateral and regional issues, including trade relations and scientific cooperation.


UPDATE (March 15, 2024): China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, is set to embark on a key diplomatic mission to New Zealand and Australia from March 17 to March 21, 2024. This visit comes following invitations from New Zealand’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Peters, and Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne. A pivotal aspect of Wang Yi’s agenda will be his attendance at the seventh round of China-Australia Diplomatic and Strategic Dialogue (hereinafter, “the Dialogue”), scheduled during his stay in Australia. The Dialogue is anticipated to tackle various bilateral and regional issues.

As reported by SCMP on February 29, 2024, Australia has extended an official invitation to China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, marking a significant development in the ongoing dialogue between the two nations.

Against this backdrop, the invitation reflects a concerted effort to address a range of contentious issues that have strained diplomatic ties in recent years.

The upcoming discussions between China and Australia will center around critical issues that have the potential to shape the trajectory of their bilateral relations. The negotiation dynamics between these two countries are marked by a nuanced interplay of interests, priorities, and strategic imperatives.

Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) is actively advocating for the lifting of sanctions on Australian wine and lobsters, which have strained trade relations between the two countries. Seeking sanctions relief underscores Australia’s efforts to alleviate economic pressures and facilitate bilateral trade and investment.

Concurrently, China is pressing Australia to commit to a new Science and Technology Agreement, aiming to foster collaborative efforts in areas of mutual interest. Despite challenges posed by the broader geopolitical context, China’s emphasis on scientific and technological cooperation reflects its acknowledgment of the benefits of engagement and partnership in addressing global challenges and promoting sustainable development.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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China props up state-owned developer Vanke as property crisis deepens

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China has asked 12 banks to provide financing to the beleaguered state-owned real estate firm, Vanke Group, just days after the housing and urban-rural development ministry vowed to let insolvent property developers go bankrupt.

The Chinese government’s support bucks its recent trend of letting indebted developers take their own downward course, which has compounded a spiraling crisis in the sector, once a major economic growth driver. 

Privately-held Evergrande Group and Country Garden Holdings were left to their own devices as their debts soared, leaving their creditors and homebuyers high and dry in trying to recover investments. The Hong Kong High Court issued a liquidation order for Evergrande in January. A similar fate looms for Country Garden which received a liquidation petition from one of its creditors in Hong Kong. Both companies are listed in Hong Kong.

In contrast, rescue efforts for Vanke, part-owned by the Shenzhen government, are being coordinated by the State Council, China’s cabinet amid Chinese President Xi Jinping’s policy of advancing state enterprises and a retreat of the private sector. 

The State Council has requested financial institutions to make swift progress and called on creditors to consider private debt maturity extension, according to a Reuters report on Monday, citing unnamed sources. 

Separately, the state-owned Cailian Press reported that the 12 institutions are expected to raise as much as 80 billion yuan (US$11.1 billion) for Vanke. But the report cited sources saying that the attitude maintained by each bank was conservative.

Shaky ground

Nonetheless, Vanke is likely to stay on shaky ground among investors after rating agency Moody’s lowered its credit rating to “junk.” 

“The rating actions reflect Moody’s expectation that China Vanke’s credit metrics, financial flexibility and liquidity buffer will weaken over the next 12-18 months because of its declining contracted sales and the rising uncertainties over its access to funding amid the prolonged property market downturn in China,” said Kaven Tsang, a Moody’s senior vice president in a statement this week.

The rating agency said it has placed all the ratings on review for downgrade, as it saw the company’s ability to recover sales, improve funding access, and maintain an adequate liquidity buffer to be worrying.

The government’s bid to save Vanke has aroused discussion online. Some netizens questioned the discrepancy between saving Vanke and abandoning Evergrande, while others worried that saving Vanke would reduce national resources at a time when the economy is growing at its slowest pace since 1990. There are also many posts rationalizing the government’s efforts to support Vanke.

A Vanke sign is seen above workers working at the construction site of a residential building in Dalian, Liaoning province, China September 16, 2019. (Stringer/File Photo/Reuters)

The blogger “Wuxinxinshuofang” believes that propping up Vanke is to ensure that the “hunt” for foreign capital won’t be disrupted by a Vanke-triggered real estate crisis. 

“The collapse of Vanke will bring about the debt crisis and liquidity crisis of all real estate companies. Efforts so far to prop up the market have only begun to show effects. Vanke can fail next year, but not this,” the blogger wrote.

Zombie developers to zombie banks?

Frank Xie, a professor at the University of South Carolina Aiken Business School, attributed Beijing’s support to Vanke’s state-owned background.

“The Chinese Communist Party cannot let Vanke fail, because the CCP [Communist Party of China] treats its own people and outsiders differently,” Xie pointed out. 

The failure of any state-owned assets would be “tantamount to the bankruptcy of national capital, questioning the Communist Party’s ability to run enterprises.”

Xie said that Chinese banks have accumulated a large backlog of mortgage loans involving real estate, and even assisting Vanke will only delay the explosion.

“As for other private companies facing the same problems as Evergrande, the CCP cannot save them, nor does it want to save them,” he added.

Beijing has also established a “white list” of approved property projects by distressed developers that banks and financial institutions should support in a stop-gap measure. Those deemed beyond rescue should go bankrupt.

2024-03-12T053841Z_1854898123_RC24K6AOK1VU_RTRMADP_3_CHINA-PROPERTY-DEBT-VANKE.JPG
A person walks past by a gate with a sign of Vanke at a construction site in Shanghai, China, March 21, 2017. Picture taken March 21, 2017. (Aly Song/File Photo/Reuters)

Chen Songxing, director of the New Economic Policy Research Center at National Donghua University in Taiwan, said that the Chinese official statement of “bankruptcy should be bankrupt” is merely to show the outside world Beijing is unable to save real estate developers. 

Chen said the amount of rescue for Vanke this time was insufficient to solve the problem, given how intertwined the real estate and banking industries are. He warned this was only a delay tactic which could lead to a bigger crisis.

“China’s current financial situation actually does not have the ability to save the real estate industry, as this is just transferring the debts of real estate developers and local governments to banks. 

“If you continue to save these zombie real estate developers this year, it is very likely that banks will also become zombies in the future. It is very detrimental to China’s economic development,” Chen said.

Edited by Taejun Kang and Mike Firn. 

Read the rest of this article here >>> China props up state-owned developer Vanke as property crisis deepens

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China to update M&A Regulations in 2024: Changes to Filing Thresholds

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China’s State Council has implemented revised Provisions on Declaration Standards for Business Operator Concentration, effective from January 22, 2024. Originally proposed by SAMR in June 2022, the 2024 Provisions have raised turnover criteria, benefiting big tech firms and multinational companies involved in M&A activities.


China’s State Council has released the revised Provisions of the State Council on Declaration Standards Regarding the  Concentration of Business Operators, which took effect from January 22, 2024.

The 2024 Provisions were initially proposed by the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) in June 2022. The comparatively slow legislation process indicates the Provisions had been subjected to heated discussion within the government organs.

Notably, the 2024 Provisions dropped some specific standards proposed in the 2022 draft that required any deal involving a company with annual China revenues over RMB 100 billion to be subject to review by the authorities. According to analysts, this roll-back was designed to favor the big tech firms originally, but will concurrently benefit all multinational companies (MNCs).

This article delves into the significant revisions to China’s M&A declaration thresholds and their implications, providing crucial insights for businesses and stakeholders involved in merger activities.

The 2024 Provisions have significantly raised the turnover criteria for the declaration threshold for concentration of undertakings.

The term “concentration of undertakings” refers to any of the following circumstances:

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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