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China

Gender discrimination in China’s labour income

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A Chinese job seeker looks for employment at a job fair at the Fuyang Normal University in Fuyang city, east China

Author: Jane Golley, ANU, Yixiao Zhou, ANU, and Meiyan Wang, CASS

Income inequality has been a persistent feature of China’s rapid growth and development since the late 1970s. A gender earnings gap has persisted in urban China throughout the reform period despite a narrowing of the gender gap in educational attainment in recent years. Most of the earnings gap is attributable to gender discrimination.

Market reforms have not reduced gender discrimination in the rural economy either. There has been some reduction in wage discrimination in the most marketised sectors of Chinese rural industry since the 1980s, but discrimination still accounts for two-thirds of the wage differential in these sectors. This suggests a more serious gender problem than in other industrial and developing economies.

The urban female labour force participation rate dropped to 57 per cent in 2009 from 78 per cent in 1988. This can be attributed to the intensified pressures placed on women arising from their dual responsibilities as unpaid family carers and income earners during the economic transition.

During the 1980s and 1990s, women accounted for one-third of Communist Party members. By 2017 they accounted for one-quarter. Communist Party membership is associated with earnings that were 6 per cent and 10 per cent higher for men and women, respectively, in 1995. There has also been an increasing wage reward for party membership — it rose from 29 per cent in 1988 to 33 per cent in 1999. The higher return for women did not reduce the earnings gap because of lower female membership numbers.

There are various circumstances that contribute to inequality of opportunity in China’s individual labour income. Predominant among these circumstances are the occupation and education of one’s father, alongside one’s geographical location, ethnicity and rural or urban hukou status. But ranking above all of these in China’s case is the importance of gender — a point that does not hold in any other country for which similar analyses have been conducted.

Besides circumstances, an individual’s effort — or choices — also impacts on labour market outcomes. Higher levels of education, non-agricultural occupations, Communist Party membership and non-migration are associated with higher income. Some disparities in gender inequality reflect women working fewer hours or in different occupations. For example, some 40 per cent of Chinese women and 28 per cent of men work in agriculture. Still, whether this comes down entirely to a matter of choice is debatable.

Marriage (considered a choice in most cases) is interestingly associated with higher average income for men, but lower income for women — although this is only true in rural China. Close to three-quarters of married males in rural China state that they never or rarely cook, 80 per cent never or rarely wash dishes and 82 per cent never or rarely do washing or cleaning — all significantly higher percentages than their urban counterparts. This suggests a relatively weak position of rural women in intra-household bargaining relating to the time allocation for housework.

Measures to assist young women to exit the agricultural sector and find off-farm employment would improve their earnings potential in the future. Ongoing reforms to the hukou system of household registration to ensure that rural migrants are not discriminated against in urban areas would also equalise the opportunities they face with those of their urban counterparts.

The importance of marriage and its different impact on the annual incomes of rural men and women mean China’s ‘gender discrimination’ begins in the home. The gender divide in household chores is indicative of the costs Chinese married women bear disproportionately.

Efforts to improve childcare systems and grant paternity and maternity leave are equal opportunity policies that could improve the situation, especially in rural areas. So would a cultural shift towards equal contributions by men and women to chores within the household.

Jane Golley is Associate Professor and the Director of the Australian Centre on China in the World, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University.

Yixiao Zhou is a Senior Lecturer at the Crawford School of Public Policy, the College of Asia and the Pacific, the Australian National University.

Meiyan Wang is Professor at the Institute of Population and Labor Economics, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

This article is abridged from Jane Golley, Yixiao Zhou and Meiyan Wang’s ‘Inequality of…

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China

Trends and Future Prospects of Bilateral Direct Investment between China and Germany

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China and Germany experienced a decline in direct investment in 2023 due to global economic uncertainty and policy changes. Despite this, China remains an attractive destination for German FDI. Key industries like automotive and advanced manufacturing continue to draw investors, although FDI outflows from Germany to China decreased by 30% in the first three quarters of 2023. Despite this, the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21% in the same period according to MOFCOM. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data and MOFCOM’s actual use of foreign capital provide different perspectives on the investment trends between the two countries.


Direct investment between China and Germany declined in 2023, due to a range of factors from global economic uncertainty to policy changes. However, China remains an important destination for German foreign direct investment (FDI), and key industries in both countries continue to excite investors. We look at the latest direct investment data between Germany and China to analyze the latest trends and discuss key factors that could shape future business and commercial ties.

Direct investment between China and Germany has undergone profound changes over the past decade. An increasingly complex investment environment for companies in both countries has led to falling two-way FDI figures in the first three quarters of 2023, in stark contrast to positive trends seen in 2022.

At the same time, industries with high growth potential, such as automotive and advanced manufacturing, continue to attract German companies to China, and high levels of reinvested earnings suggest established firms are doubling down on their commitments in the Chinese market. In Germany, the potential for electric vehicle (EV) sales is buoying otherwise low investment among Chinese companies.

According to data from Deutsche Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, total FDI outflows from Germany to China fell in the first three quarters of 2023, declining by 30 percent to a total of EUR 7.98 billion.

This is a marked reversal of trends from 2022, when FDI flows from Germany to China reached a record EUR 11.4 billion, up 14.7 percent year-on-year.

However, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21 percent year-on-year in the first eight months of 2023. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data, which follows standards set by the IMF, the OECD, and the European Central Bank (ECB), includes a broader scope of transactions within its direct investment data, including, broadly, direct investment positions, direct investment income flows, and direct investment financial flows.

Meanwhile, the actual use of foreign capital recorded by MOFCOM includes contracted foreign capital that has been concluded, including the registered and working capital paid by foreign investors, as well as the transaction consideration paid for the transferred equity of domestic investors.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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China’s coast guard on Saturday fired a water cannon at a Philippine supply boat in disputed waters in the South China Sea, causing “significant damages to the vessel” and injuring its crew, the Philippine coast guard said.

Manila was attempting to resupply troops stationed on a ship at the Second Thomas Shoal, known locally as Ayungin Shoal, when the Chinese coast guard and maritime militia “harassed, blocked, deployed water cannons, and executed dangerous maneuvers against the routine RoRe (rotation and resupply) mission,” said the Philippine National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea.

The West Philippine Sea is the part of the South China Sea that Manila claims as its jurisdiction.

The Chinese coast guard also set up “a floating barrier” to block access to shoal where Manila ran aground an old warship, BRP Sierra Madre, to serve as a military outpost.

The Philippine task force condemned China’s “unprovoked aggression, coercion, and dangerous maneuvers.”

Philippines’ RoRe missions have been regularly blocked by China’s coast guard, but this is the first time a barrier was set up near the shoal. 

The Philippine coast guard nevertheless claimed that the mission on Saturday was accomplished.

Potential consequences

The Second Thomas Shoal lies within the country’s exclusive economic zone where Manila holds sovereign rights. 

China, however, claims historic rights over most of the South China Sea, including the Spratly archipelago, which the shoal forms a part of.

A Chinese foreign ministry’s spokesperson on Saturday said the Philippine supply vessel “intruded” into the waters near the shoal, called Ren’ai Jiao in Chinese, “without permission from the Chinese government.”

“China coast guard took necessary measures at sea in accordance with law to safeguard China’s rights, firmly obstructed the Philippines’ vessels, and foiled the Philippines’ attempt,” the ministry said.

“If the Philippines insists on going its own way, China will continue to adopt resolute measures,” the spokesperson said, warning that Manila “should be prepared to bear all potential consequences.”

Chinese Maritime Militia vessels near the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, March 5, 2024. (Adrian Portugal/Reuters)

U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson wrote on social media platform X that her country “stands with the Philippines” against China’s maneuvers.

Beijing’s “interference with the Philippines’ freedom of navigation violates international law and threatens a free and open Indo-Pacific,” she wrote.

Australian Ambassador to the Philippines Hae Kyong Yu also said that Canberra shares the Philippines’ “serious concerns about dangerous conduct by China’s vessels adjacent to Second Thomas Shoal.” 

“This is part of a pattern of deeply concerning behavior,” Yu wrote on X.

Edited by Jim Snyder.

Read the rest of this article here >>> Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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Foreigners in China: 2024 Living and Working Guidelines

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China’s Ministry of Commerce released updated guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China in 2024. The guidelines cover accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols. It also outlines responsibilities regarding social security premiums and individual income tax obligations. prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required upon arrival.


The updated 2024 guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China, released by the country’s Ministry of Commerce, outline essential procedures and considerations covering accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols.

On January 25, 2024, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) released the latest version of the Guidelines for Foreign Businessmen to Live and Work in China (hereinafter referred to as the “guidelines”).

The document is divided into four main sections, labeled as:

Furthermore, the guidelines elucidate the regulatory framework governing foreign businessperson’s responsibilities concerning social security premiums and individual income tax obligations.

This article provides a comprehensive overview of the guidelines, delving into their significance and implications for foreign businesspersons in China.

Upon arrival in China, prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required.

If staying in a hotel, registration can be facilitated by the hotel staff upon presentation of a valid passport or international travel documents.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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