China
Chinese lawfare, resource disputes and the law of the sea
Author: Douglas Guilfoyle, UNSW Canberra
China notoriously claims special maritime rights in the South China Sea within the ‘nine-dash line’ that appears on official Chinese maps. The precise origin of the line remains obscured. The ‘nine-dash line’ did not appear on government maps prior to 1947 or in private cartographic exercises before 1933. As late as 2013, prominent Chinese scholars accepted that China had never expressly articulated the line’s legal significance.
Recent Chinese claims to exclusive jurisdiction over resources within it have escalated tensions not only over oil but also over exploited and declining fish stocks ‘fundamental to the food security of coastal populations numbering in the hundreds of millions’. But China’s legal argument about the South China Sea should be seen both in its historical context and in light of China’s doctrine on information warfare.
Law plays an important role in the dispute over the nine-dash line because the line cuts deep into what various coastal states including Vietnam and the Philippines regard as their 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Ironically, in the marathon negotiations that lead to UNCLOS, China was a principal advocate of the EEZ concept, aligning itself with developing countries against Russia and the United States.
It is useful to review the issues that were of fundamental concern to China in the UNCLOS negotiations. These are documented in Chinese working papers submitted to the UN Seabed Committee in the early 1970s and in speeches China made during the negotiation process.
China advocated for five main positions. First, that there was no fixed maximum width to the territorial sea — the extent of a state’s maritime domain was a sovereign decision to be informed by economic and security needs. Second, warships had no automatic right of innocent passage through territorial seas and straits. Third, China’s own Chiungchow Strait and vast Bohai Bay had a special status as ‘internal waters’. Fourth, that maritime boundaries should be settled only by consultation and UNCLOS should make no provision for the judicial settlement of such disputes. Fifth, a continental state with sovereignty over an outlying archipelago could draw straight baselines around it and use these to measure a territorial sea.
Notably, though China expressly claimed a special status for some waters it never did so for the South China Sea. China maintained its Chiungchow Strait and Bohai Bay claims throughout negotiations, along with its position on warships and innocent passage. But Beijing abandoned its position on the width of the territorial sea and on ‘outlying archipelagos’. This history shows that China’s recent supposed enjoyment of ‘special historic rights’ within the nine-dash line is the product of a very new legal claim.
A major blow to the Chinese position in favour of coastal states enjoying their ‘ordinary’ EEZs came in the Philippines v China arbitration. Since then, the Chinese government has pivoted back to a version of the ‘outlying archipelago’ argument previously abandoned during UNCLOS negotiations, an argument revived in the Chinese Society of International Law’s ‘critical study’ of the Philippines v China arbitral award. China now claims it can bundle up various maritime features into ‘archipelagos’, enclose them in straight baselines and project EEZs from them.
The argument is both historically revisionist and legally unconvincing. However, in addition to the creation of EEZ claims, re-characterising certain features as islands or archipelagos allows China to claim US warships are constrained in navigating near such features. The United States maintains that such features are not capable of generating territorial seas and that it is exercising freedom of navigation applicable in an EEZ or on the high seas. But why is China bothering to make such arguments at all?
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) appreciates the power of law. Its ‘three warfares’ doctrine outlines a triad of non-kinetic methods for achieving China’s national goals: public opinion warfare, psychological warfare and legal warfare. Among these, the function of legal warfare (‘lawfare’) is explained by Livermore as ‘leveraging of existing legal regimes and processes to constrain adversary behaviour, contest disadvantageous circumstances, confuse legal precedent, and maximise advantage in situations related to the PRC’s core interests’.
The function…
China
China Unveils Plan to Upgrade Industrial Equipment
China unveiled a comprehensive action plan for upgrading industrial equipment, with a focus on driving technological innovation and economic growth. The plan, released on April 9, 2024, aims to enhance competitiveness and sustainability within the manufacturing sector through extensive investment and regulatory support.
China announced an ambitious action plan for industrial equipment upgrading, which aims to drive technological innovation and economic growth through extensive investment and regulatory support.
On April 9, 2024, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and six other departments jointly released a notice introducing the Implementation Plan for Promoting Equipment Renewal in the Industrial Sector (hereafter referred to as the “action plan”).
Finalized earlier on March 23, 2024, this comprehensive action plan addresses critical issues related to technological innovation and economic development. It reflects China’s proactive stance in enhancing competitiveness and sustainability within its manufacturing sector. The initiative underscores the recognition of industrial equipment upgrading as a top policy priority.
The scope of China’s action plan to upgrade industrial equipment in manufacturing, is extensive, covering various aspects such as:
In line with China’s ambitious goals for industrial modernization and sustainable development, the action plan outlines several key objectives aimed at driving substantial advancements in the industrial sector by 2027.
These objectives encompass a wide range of areas, from increasing investment to enhancing digitalization and promoting innovation, including:
The objectives and key actions proposed in the action plan are summarized below.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
China deepens engagement with new Indonesian president as top diplomat visits Jakarta
China’s top diplomat met the outgoing Indonesian president and his successor in Jakarta on Thursday, as Beijing deepened its engagement with future leader Prabowo Subianto, amid a competition for regional influence with the United States.
The meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was part of a joint commitment to advance the partnership between the two countries, said Prabowo, who visited Beijing in early April after his landslide win in the February general election.
“It is a great honor for me to welcome him [Wang] today. Thank you for the kind reception I received in Beijing a few weeks ago,” Prabowo said, according to an Indonesian defense ministry statement.
Chinese President Xi Jinping had invited Prabowo to visit, and the latter accepting the invitation raised eyebrows in Indonesia because no president-elect had made a foreign visit such as this one without being sworn in. China is Indonesia’s largest trading partner.
Wang, too, mentioned Prabowo’s Beijing trip, according to the same statement.
“We really appreciate and welcome Defense Minister Prabowo’s visit to China,” he said.
“We are committed to continuing to increase bilateral cooperation with Indonesia, both in the defense sector and other fields such as economic, social and cultural.”
Wang is scheduled to go to East Nusa Tenggara province on Friday to attend the China-Indonesia High-Level Dialogue Cooperation Mechanism, a process to support more effective bilateral cooperation. His Jakarta stop was the first of a six-day tour that also includes Cambodia and Papua New Guinea.
Prabowo and Wang discussed cooperation in the defense industry and sector, with potential measures such as educational and training collaboration, as well as joint exercises, said Brig. Gen. Edwin Adrian Sumantha, spokesman at the Indonesian defense ministry.
In fact, the ministry statement said that “China is Indonesia’s close partner and has had close bilateral relations, especially in the defense sector, for a long time.”
Of course, China has also invested billions of U.S. dollars in infrastructure projects in Indonesia, including as part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative – the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed train, which began commercial operations in October 2023, is one such BRI project.
The two countries have drawn closer during outgoing President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s two terms, and Beijing would like that to continue as the U.S. tries to catch up with China’s gargantuan influence in Southeast Asia, analysts have said.
Indonesia, China call for ceasefire in Gaza
Both Indonesia and China shared the same position on Israel’s devastating attacks on Gaza, said Wang’s Indonesian counterpart, Retno Marsudi.
Israel’s air and ground strikes have killed more than 33,000 Palestinians following the Oct. 7 attack on the Jewish state by Palestinian militant group Hamas, which killed around 1,100 Israelis.
“We … have the same view regarding the importance of a ceasefire in Gaza and resolving the Palestinian problem fairly through two state solutions,” Retno told reporters in a joint press conference after meeting with Wang.
“Indonesia will support full Palestinian membership in the U.N. Middle East stability will not be realized without resolving the Palestinian issue.”
For his part, Wang slammed Washington for repeatedly vetoing resolutions calling for Israel to end the attacks on the Palestinian territory it occupies.
“The conflict in Gaza has lasted for half a year and caused a rare humanitarian tragedy in the 21st century,” Wang told the media at the same press conference, according to the Associated Press.
“The United Nations Security Council responded to the call of the international community and continued to review the resolution draft on the cease-fire in Gaza, but it was repeatedly vetoed by the United States.”
The conflict in the Middle East offered a strategic opportunity for China to further expand its influence in Southeast Asia, said Muhamad Arif, a lecturer in international relations at the University of Indonesia.
“China is trying to strengthen its position as a key player in the region,” Arief told BenarNews.
China could present an alternative approach to the conflict in Gaza, he said, which may find approval in Southeast Asia’s largest country, Indonesia, and other Mulism-majority states in the region, such as Malaysia and Brunei.
BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated online news organization.
Read the rest of this article here >>> China deepens engagement with new Indonesian president as top diplomat visits Jakarta
China
New Publication: A Guide for Foreign Investors on Navigating China’s New Company Law
The sixth revision of China’s Company Law is the most extensive amendment in history, impacting foreign invested enterprises with stricter rules on capital injection and corporate governance. Most FIEs must align with the New Company Law by July 1, 2024, with a deadline of December 31, 2024 for adjustments. Contact Dezan Shira & Associates for assistance.
The sixth revision of China’s Company Law represents the most extensive amendment in its history. From stricter capital injection rules to enhanced corporate governance, the changes introduced in the New Company Law have far-reaching implications for businesses, including foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) operating in or entering the China market.
Since January 1, 2020, the Company Law has governed both wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs) and joint ventures (JVs), following the enactment of the Foreign Investment Law (FIL). Most FIEs must align with the provisions of the New Company Law from July 1, 2024, while those established before January 1, 2020 have bit more time for adjustments due to the five-year grace period provided by the FIL. The final deadline for their alignment is December 31, 2024.
In this publication, we guide foreign investors through the implications of the New Company Law for existing and new FIEs and relevant stakeholders. We begin with an overview of the revision’s background and objectives, followed by a summary of key changes. Our in-depth analysis, from a foreign stakeholder perspective, illuminates the practical implications. Lastly, we explore tax impacts alongside the revisions, demonstrating how the New Company Law may shape future business transactions and arrangements.
If you or your company require assistance with Company Law adjustments in China, please do not hesitate to contact Dezan Shira & Associates. For more information, feel free to reach us via email at china@dezshira.com.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
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- New Publication: A Guide for Foreign Investors on Navigating China’s New Company Law
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