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China

Navigating around the Chinese hegemon

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Author: Xiang Gao, University of New England

How a rising China will integrate itself with the global economic and political order is a salient issue in world politics. On the one hand, China’s rejection of the South China Sea arbitration, its efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally and its willingness to work with controversial leadership in developing states indicate a more assertive ‘China First’ foreign policy. On the other hand, it is evident that China is engaging in significant multilateral and normative actions.

China’s rapid economic growth since 1978 has been accompanied by an increased involvement in global and regional governance. As of 2018, China is an active member of 65 international organisations, has ratified or signed over 220 international treaties and has implemented a significant amount of international obligations and laws into its domestic legal system.

Along with this international engagement, China is developing a ‘responsible power diplomacy’ — creating political discourse around ‘China’s peaceful rise’ and China’s intention to build a ‘harmonious world’. These initiatives seek to displace China’s old image of a ‘hegemon on the horizon’ with the new image of a responsible and cooperative great power that is fully committed to international norms and a rule-based international order.

The notion of a responsible and cooperative great power does not exclude a state from pursuing its national interest. Rather, the normative environment and interactions in the international community impacts the determination of national interests. These norms tend to reinforce policies that provide international public goods (such as security) or facilitate a redefinition of national interest away from the traditional values of absolute state sovereignty and non-interference to include such things as a commitment to institution building and international human rights. Being a responsible and cooperative great power carries with it the notion that the ability to attain foreign policy objectives short of violence and coercion are dependent on shared norms and values.

International values are often ignored in ‘high politics’ concerning national and international security. Yet it is evident that the international community is saturated in these norms and that they have been internalised by national policymakers. For example, states may pursue certain foreign policies that have little if any material reward. Canada is a ‘helpful fixer’ participating in UN peacekeeping missions and South Africa (before the setback of Jacob Zuma) was a ‘beacon of human rights’.

From this perspective, a review of a range of foreign policies suggests that Chinese policymakers have internalised a set of international norms in some areas even as the Chinese state has vigorously pursued unilateral foreign policy objectives.

First, it has increasingly described itself as a ‘responsible power’ that supports and ascribes to international norms. Various UN Security Council votes or abstentions, such as in the 2011 Libyan intervention and collective anti-piracy support in the Indian Ocean, suggest the impact of normative collective values.

Second, it has specifically incorporated and ‘localised’ various international laws and values into its domestic system. For example, after signing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, China passed a new mental health law in 2013 that greatly expanded the legal protection of mentally ill persons in committal procedures and treatment protocols.

These localisation measures can be used to garner good will and global leadership opportunities. As China actively seeks to incorporate biodiversity and climate change planning into its domestic law with its development of the China Business and Biodiversity Partnership, it has championed itself as a global leader in these areas. In 2020, China will hold the 15th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity.

But serious challenges remain. China’s bilateral approach to the South China Sea, increasing strategic reach, and the current disputes over international trade and investment suggest that material national interests rather than normative values may dominate Chinese foreign policy as much as many other great powers.

The international values of sovereign rights and non-interference norms are sometimes used to insulate China from criticism of foreign investment in the developing world. Similarly, China is very cautious of humanitarian intervention and…

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China

Trends and Future Prospects of Bilateral Direct Investment between China and Germany

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China and Germany experienced a decline in direct investment in 2023 due to global economic uncertainty and policy changes. Despite this, China remains an attractive destination for German FDI. Key industries like automotive and advanced manufacturing continue to draw investors, although FDI outflows from Germany to China decreased by 30% in the first three quarters of 2023. Despite this, the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21% in the same period according to MOFCOM. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data and MOFCOM’s actual use of foreign capital provide different perspectives on the investment trends between the two countries.


Direct investment between China and Germany declined in 2023, due to a range of factors from global economic uncertainty to policy changes. However, China remains an important destination for German foreign direct investment (FDI), and key industries in both countries continue to excite investors. We look at the latest direct investment data between Germany and China to analyze the latest trends and discuss key factors that could shape future business and commercial ties.

Direct investment between China and Germany has undergone profound changes over the past decade. An increasingly complex investment environment for companies in both countries has led to falling two-way FDI figures in the first three quarters of 2023, in stark contrast to positive trends seen in 2022.

At the same time, industries with high growth potential, such as automotive and advanced manufacturing, continue to attract German companies to China, and high levels of reinvested earnings suggest established firms are doubling down on their commitments in the Chinese market. In Germany, the potential for electric vehicle (EV) sales is buoying otherwise low investment among Chinese companies.

According to data from Deutsche Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, total FDI outflows from Germany to China fell in the first three quarters of 2023, declining by 30 percent to a total of EUR 7.98 billion.

This is a marked reversal of trends from 2022, when FDI flows from Germany to China reached a record EUR 11.4 billion, up 14.7 percent year-on-year.

However, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21 percent year-on-year in the first eight months of 2023. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data, which follows standards set by the IMF, the OECD, and the European Central Bank (ECB), includes a broader scope of transactions within its direct investment data, including, broadly, direct investment positions, direct investment income flows, and direct investment financial flows.

Meanwhile, the actual use of foreign capital recorded by MOFCOM includes contracted foreign capital that has been concluded, including the registered and working capital paid by foreign investors, as well as the transaction consideration paid for the transferred equity of domestic investors.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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China’s coast guard on Saturday fired a water cannon at a Philippine supply boat in disputed waters in the South China Sea, causing “significant damages to the vessel” and injuring its crew, the Philippine coast guard said.

Manila was attempting to resupply troops stationed on a ship at the Second Thomas Shoal, known locally as Ayungin Shoal, when the Chinese coast guard and maritime militia “harassed, blocked, deployed water cannons, and executed dangerous maneuvers against the routine RoRe (rotation and resupply) mission,” said the Philippine National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea.

The West Philippine Sea is the part of the South China Sea that Manila claims as its jurisdiction.

The Chinese coast guard also set up “a floating barrier” to block access to shoal where Manila ran aground an old warship, BRP Sierra Madre, to serve as a military outpost.

The Philippine task force condemned China’s “unprovoked aggression, coercion, and dangerous maneuvers.”

Philippines’ RoRe missions have been regularly blocked by China’s coast guard, but this is the first time a barrier was set up near the shoal. 

The Philippine coast guard nevertheless claimed that the mission on Saturday was accomplished.

Potential consequences

The Second Thomas Shoal lies within the country’s exclusive economic zone where Manila holds sovereign rights. 

China, however, claims historic rights over most of the South China Sea, including the Spratly archipelago, which the shoal forms a part of.

A Chinese foreign ministry’s spokesperson on Saturday said the Philippine supply vessel “intruded” into the waters near the shoal, called Ren’ai Jiao in Chinese, “without permission from the Chinese government.”

“China coast guard took necessary measures at sea in accordance with law to safeguard China’s rights, firmly obstructed the Philippines’ vessels, and foiled the Philippines’ attempt,” the ministry said.

“If the Philippines insists on going its own way, China will continue to adopt resolute measures,” the spokesperson said, warning that Manila “should be prepared to bear all potential consequences.”

Chinese Maritime Militia vessels near the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, March 5, 2024. (Adrian Portugal/Reuters)

U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson wrote on social media platform X that her country “stands with the Philippines” against China’s maneuvers.

Beijing’s “interference with the Philippines’ freedom of navigation violates international law and threatens a free and open Indo-Pacific,” she wrote.

Australian Ambassador to the Philippines Hae Kyong Yu also said that Canberra shares the Philippines’ “serious concerns about dangerous conduct by China’s vessels adjacent to Second Thomas Shoal.” 

“This is part of a pattern of deeply concerning behavior,” Yu wrote on X.

Edited by Jim Snyder.

Read the rest of this article here >>> Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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Foreigners in China: 2024 Living and Working Guidelines

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China’s Ministry of Commerce released updated guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China in 2024. The guidelines cover accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols. It also outlines responsibilities regarding social security premiums and individual income tax obligations. prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required upon arrival.


The updated 2024 guidelines for foreign businesspersons living and working in China, released by the country’s Ministry of Commerce, outline essential procedures and considerations covering accommodations, visas, work permits, and emergency protocols.

On January 25, 2024, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) released the latest version of the Guidelines for Foreign Businessmen to Live and Work in China (hereinafter referred to as the “guidelines”).

The document is divided into four main sections, labeled as:

Furthermore, the guidelines elucidate the regulatory framework governing foreign businessperson’s responsibilities concerning social security premiums and individual income tax obligations.

This article provides a comprehensive overview of the guidelines, delving into their significance and implications for foreign businesspersons in China.

Upon arrival in China, prompt registration for temporary accommodation is required.

If staying in a hotel, registration can be facilitated by the hotel staff upon presentation of a valid passport or international travel documents.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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