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Mao’s ‘people’s war’ revisited : China’s military cyber power and ‘cyber militias’

Mao’s ‘people’s war’ doctrine stressed that China’s military advantage lay in mobilising the vast Chinese population

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China’s military cyber power capabilities are increasingly being augmented by a civilian dimension to increase their potency.

However, in this relatively new domain for civil–military integration, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is taking action to consolidate state control over China’s cyber power projection.

Just before the 19th CCP Congress in 2018, the Cyberspace Administration of China released one of the most authoritative policy documents to date outlining Chinese thinking on cyberspace.

The document outlines the need to ‘promote the deepened development of military–civilian integration for cybersecurity and informatisation’. It also features instructions to implement civil–military integration systems, cybersecurity projects and innovation policies.

This policy document followed the creation in January 2017 of the Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development.

Under the instructions of the Commission, China’s first ‘cybersecurity innovation centre’ was established in December 2017. Operated by 360 Enterprise Security Group (one of China’s primary cybersecurity companies), the centre’s remit is to foster private sector cooperation to ‘help [the military] win future cyber wars’.

The strong civil–military dimension of Chinese military power has existed since the formation of the People’s Republic of China. Mao’s ‘people’s war’ doctrine stressed that China’s military advantage lay in mobilising the vast Chinese population.

The push to leverage the civilian sector for the development of China’s military cyber capabilities is gaining steam outside of military circles as well.

The National Outline for Medium and Long Term Science and Technology Development Planning (2006–20) emphasises the importance of integrating civilian and military scientific and technical efforts.

The PLA has heeded such calls, deepening its partnerships with the civilian telecommunications sector — especially ZTE and Huawei — and developing further links with universities.

China’s ‘cyber militias’ are one of the clearest products of this shift

These groups have grown to feature a collective membership of more than 10 million people since the turn of the millennium, and are often based in universities and civilian corporations. While the PLA endorsed cyber militias as a concept in 2006, these groups will likely be restrained to cyber espionage as opposed to offensive cyber operations, given the risk of potentially undermining the work of regular PLA cyber units.

Of the cyber militias, China’s infamous ‘patriotic hackers’ are perhaps the most well known. While these hackers can be a useful tool in hampering state adversaries, they can also often be unruly, erratic and heavy-handed.

These hackers are typically driven by popular nationalism, as demonstrated by instances like the cyber stoushes between US and Chinese hackers that followed the US EP-3 incident in 2001.

The Strategic Support Force (SSF) has been the PLA’s answer to mitigating the risk of erratic cyber militias while still harnessing their capabilities. Established in December 2015 to merge and centralise all of the PLA’s space, cyber and ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities in one body, the SSF has also assumed control over a number of PLA research institutes.

The integration of these civilian entities into formalised state structures like the SSF represents a desire by China to mitigate the volatility of these hackers.

But this integration means the PLA and the Chinese state will have to forego plausible deniability when their hackers’ operations are uncovered by other states. The improved US ability to attribute cyber operations to Chinese actors, combined with Washington’s budding approach of sanctioning major Chinese state-owned enterprises in retaliation, has made Beijing realise it needs to run a tighter ship.

The centralisation that Beijing is pursuing is a manifestation of the so-called ‘corporate state’ that increasingly defines the Chinese political system. Here, the CCP acknowledges the presence of societal interest groups as an inevitable result of a pluralising society. At the same time, the CCP seeks to co-opt or direct the behaviour of these entities to serve its ends and maintain stability.

The civil–military dimension of China’s cyber power projection has been sporadically apparent since the early 2000s. But it is only recently that we are seeing concerted efforts to leverage the civilian sphere and, more importantly, to centralise and organise it so that it can consistently serve China’s defence and military aims.

Author: Nicholas Lyall, ANU

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Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister, will visit Australia to discuss trade and technology.

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China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, will visit New Zealand and Australia from March 17 to March 21, 2024, following invitations from both countries. The visit will include discussions on various bilateral and regional issues, including trade relations and scientific cooperation.


UPDATE (March 15, 2024): China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, is set to embark on a key diplomatic mission to New Zealand and Australia from March 17 to March 21, 2024. This visit comes following invitations from New Zealand’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Peters, and Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne. A pivotal aspect of Wang Yi’s agenda will be his attendance at the seventh round of China-Australia Diplomatic and Strategic Dialogue (hereinafter, “the Dialogue”), scheduled during his stay in Australia. The Dialogue is anticipated to tackle various bilateral and regional issues.

As reported by SCMP on February 29, 2024, Australia has extended an official invitation to China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, marking a significant development in the ongoing dialogue between the two nations.

Against this backdrop, the invitation reflects a concerted effort to address a range of contentious issues that have strained diplomatic ties in recent years.

The upcoming discussions between China and Australia will center around critical issues that have the potential to shape the trajectory of their bilateral relations. The negotiation dynamics between these two countries are marked by a nuanced interplay of interests, priorities, and strategic imperatives.

Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) is actively advocating for the lifting of sanctions on Australian wine and lobsters, which have strained trade relations between the two countries. Seeking sanctions relief underscores Australia’s efforts to alleviate economic pressures and facilitate bilateral trade and investment.

Concurrently, China is pressing Australia to commit to a new Science and Technology Agreement, aiming to foster collaborative efforts in areas of mutual interest. Despite challenges posed by the broader geopolitical context, China’s emphasis on scientific and technological cooperation reflects its acknowledgment of the benefits of engagement and partnership in addressing global challenges and promoting sustainable development.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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China props up state-owned developer Vanke as property crisis deepens

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China has asked 12 banks to provide financing to the beleaguered state-owned real estate firm, Vanke Group, just days after the housing and urban-rural development ministry vowed to let insolvent property developers go bankrupt.

The Chinese government’s support bucks its recent trend of letting indebted developers take their own downward course, which has compounded a spiraling crisis in the sector, once a major economic growth driver. 

Privately-held Evergrande Group and Country Garden Holdings were left to their own devices as their debts soared, leaving their creditors and homebuyers high and dry in trying to recover investments. The Hong Kong High Court issued a liquidation order for Evergrande in January. A similar fate looms for Country Garden which received a liquidation petition from one of its creditors in Hong Kong. Both companies are listed in Hong Kong.

In contrast, rescue efforts for Vanke, part-owned by the Shenzhen government, are being coordinated by the State Council, China’s cabinet amid Chinese President Xi Jinping’s policy of advancing state enterprises and a retreat of the private sector. 

The State Council has requested financial institutions to make swift progress and called on creditors to consider private debt maturity extension, according to a Reuters report on Monday, citing unnamed sources. 

Separately, the state-owned Cailian Press reported that the 12 institutions are expected to raise as much as 80 billion yuan (US$11.1 billion) for Vanke. But the report cited sources saying that the attitude maintained by each bank was conservative.

Shaky ground

Nonetheless, Vanke is likely to stay on shaky ground among investors after rating agency Moody’s lowered its credit rating to “junk.” 

“The rating actions reflect Moody’s expectation that China Vanke’s credit metrics, financial flexibility and liquidity buffer will weaken over the next 12-18 months because of its declining contracted sales and the rising uncertainties over its access to funding amid the prolonged property market downturn in China,” said Kaven Tsang, a Moody’s senior vice president in a statement this week.

The rating agency said it has placed all the ratings on review for downgrade, as it saw the company’s ability to recover sales, improve funding access, and maintain an adequate liquidity buffer to be worrying.

The government’s bid to save Vanke has aroused discussion online. Some netizens questioned the discrepancy between saving Vanke and abandoning Evergrande, while others worried that saving Vanke would reduce national resources at a time when the economy is growing at its slowest pace since 1990. There are also many posts rationalizing the government’s efforts to support Vanke.

A Vanke sign is seen above workers working at the construction site of a residential building in Dalian, Liaoning province, China September 16, 2019. (Stringer/File Photo/Reuters)

The blogger “Wuxinxinshuofang” believes that propping up Vanke is to ensure that the “hunt” for foreign capital won’t be disrupted by a Vanke-triggered real estate crisis. 

“The collapse of Vanke will bring about the debt crisis and liquidity crisis of all real estate companies. Efforts so far to prop up the market have only begun to show effects. Vanke can fail next year, but not this,” the blogger wrote.

Zombie developers to zombie banks?

Frank Xie, a professor at the University of South Carolina Aiken Business School, attributed Beijing’s support to Vanke’s state-owned background.

“The Chinese Communist Party cannot let Vanke fail, because the CCP [Communist Party of China] treats its own people and outsiders differently,” Xie pointed out. 

The failure of any state-owned assets would be “tantamount to the bankruptcy of national capital, questioning the Communist Party’s ability to run enterprises.”

Xie said that Chinese banks have accumulated a large backlog of mortgage loans involving real estate, and even assisting Vanke will only delay the explosion.

“As for other private companies facing the same problems as Evergrande, the CCP cannot save them, nor does it want to save them,” he added.

Beijing has also established a “white list” of approved property projects by distressed developers that banks and financial institutions should support in a stop-gap measure. Those deemed beyond rescue should go bankrupt.

2024-03-12T053841Z_1854898123_RC24K6AOK1VU_RTRMADP_3_CHINA-PROPERTY-DEBT-VANKE.JPG
A person walks past by a gate with a sign of Vanke at a construction site in Shanghai, China, March 21, 2017. Picture taken March 21, 2017. (Aly Song/File Photo/Reuters)

Chen Songxing, director of the New Economic Policy Research Center at National Donghua University in Taiwan, said that the Chinese official statement of “bankruptcy should be bankrupt” is merely to show the outside world Beijing is unable to save real estate developers. 

Chen said the amount of rescue for Vanke this time was insufficient to solve the problem, given how intertwined the real estate and banking industries are. He warned this was only a delay tactic which could lead to a bigger crisis.

“China’s current financial situation actually does not have the ability to save the real estate industry, as this is just transferring the debts of real estate developers and local governments to banks. 

“If you continue to save these zombie real estate developers this year, it is very likely that banks will also become zombies in the future. It is very detrimental to China’s economic development,” Chen said.

Edited by Taejun Kang and Mike Firn. 

Read the rest of this article here >>> China props up state-owned developer Vanke as property crisis deepens

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China to update M&A Regulations in 2024: Changes to Filing Thresholds

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China’s State Council has implemented revised Provisions on Declaration Standards for Business Operator Concentration, effective from January 22, 2024. Originally proposed by SAMR in June 2022, the 2024 Provisions have raised turnover criteria, benefiting big tech firms and multinational companies involved in M&A activities.


China’s State Council has released the revised Provisions of the State Council on Declaration Standards Regarding the  Concentration of Business Operators, which took effect from January 22, 2024.

The 2024 Provisions were initially proposed by the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) in June 2022. The comparatively slow legislation process indicates the Provisions had been subjected to heated discussion within the government organs.

Notably, the 2024 Provisions dropped some specific standards proposed in the 2022 draft that required any deal involving a company with annual China revenues over RMB 100 billion to be subject to review by the authorities. According to analysts, this roll-back was designed to favor the big tech firms originally, but will concurrently benefit all multinational companies (MNCs).

This article delves into the significant revisions to China’s M&A declaration thresholds and their implications, providing crucial insights for businesses and stakeholders involved in merger activities.

The 2024 Provisions have significantly raised the turnover criteria for the declaration threshold for concentration of undertakings.

The term “concentration of undertakings” refers to any of the following circumstances:

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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