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China

Mao’s ‘people’s war’ revisited : China’s military cyber power and ‘cyber militias’

Mao’s ‘people’s war’ doctrine stressed that China’s military advantage lay in mobilising the vast Chinese population

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China’s military cyber power capabilities are increasingly being augmented by a civilian dimension to increase their potency.

However, in this relatively new domain for civil–military integration, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is taking action to consolidate state control over China’s cyber power projection.

Just before the 19th CCP Congress in 2018, the Cyberspace Administration of China released one of the most authoritative policy documents to date outlining Chinese thinking on cyberspace.

The document outlines the need to ‘promote the deepened development of military–civilian integration for cybersecurity and informatisation’. It also features instructions to implement civil–military integration systems, cybersecurity projects and innovation policies.

This policy document followed the creation in January 2017 of the Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development.

Under the instructions of the Commission, China’s first ‘cybersecurity innovation centre’ was established in December 2017. Operated by 360 Enterprise Security Group (one of China’s primary cybersecurity companies), the centre’s remit is to foster private sector cooperation to ‘help [the military] win future cyber wars’.

The strong civil–military dimension of Chinese military power has existed since the formation of the People’s Republic of China. Mao’s ‘people’s war’ doctrine stressed that China’s military advantage lay in mobilising the vast Chinese population.

The push to leverage the civilian sector for the development of China’s military cyber capabilities is gaining steam outside of military circles as well.

The National Outline for Medium and Long Term Science and Technology Development Planning (2006–20) emphasises the importance of integrating civilian and military scientific and technical efforts.

The PLA has heeded such calls, deepening its partnerships with the civilian telecommunications sector — especially ZTE and Huawei — and developing further links with universities.

China’s ‘cyber militias’ are one of the clearest products of this shift

These groups have grown to feature a collective membership of more than 10 million people since the turn of the millennium, and are often based in universities and civilian corporations. While the PLA endorsed cyber militias as a concept in 2006, these groups will likely be restrained to cyber espionage as opposed to offensive cyber operations, given the risk of potentially undermining the work of regular PLA cyber units.

Of the cyber militias, China’s infamous ‘patriotic hackers’ are perhaps the most well known. While these hackers can be a useful tool in hampering state adversaries, they can also often be unruly, erratic and heavy-handed.

These hackers are typically driven by popular nationalism, as demonstrated by instances like the cyber stoushes between US and Chinese hackers that followed the US EP-3 incident in 2001.

The Strategic Support Force (SSF) has been the PLA’s answer to mitigating the risk of erratic cyber militias while still harnessing their capabilities. Established in December 2015 to merge and centralise all of the PLA’s space, cyber and ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities in one body, the SSF has also assumed control over a number of PLA research institutes.

The integration of these civilian entities into formalised state structures like the SSF represents a desire by China to mitigate the volatility of these hackers.

But this integration means the PLA and the Chinese state will have to forego plausible deniability when their hackers’ operations are uncovered by other states. The improved US ability to attribute cyber operations to Chinese actors, combined with Washington’s budding approach of sanctioning major Chinese state-owned enterprises in retaliation, has made Beijing realise it needs to run a tighter ship.

The centralisation that Beijing is pursuing is a manifestation of the so-called ‘corporate state’ that increasingly defines the Chinese political system. Here, the CCP acknowledges the presence of societal interest groups as an inevitable result of a pluralising society. At the same time, the CCP seeks to co-opt or direct the behaviour of these entities to serve its ends and maintain stability.

The civil–military dimension of China’s cyber power projection has been sporadically apparent since the early 2000s. But it is only recently that we are seeing concerted efforts to leverage the civilian sphere and, more importantly, to centralise and organise it so that it can consistently serve China’s defence and military aims.

Author: Nicholas Lyall, ANU

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Overview of China’s New Guidelines for Enhanced Payment Services for Foreigners

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The People’s Bank of China has released guidelines on payment services for foreign visitors and businesses in China, offering information on mobile payments, bank cards, and cash usage. The aim is to improve inclusivity, address barriers, and promote acceptance of various payment methods to enhance the experience for international users.


Following continuous efforts for optimized payment services for foreign visitors and businesses in China, the People’s Bank of China has recently released a set of guidelines detailing the array of payment methods currently accessible to foreign nationals across the mainland. Spanning from mobile payments to bank cards, and cash, these guidelines also offer clear instructions on utilizing each method.

The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has recently released a comprehensive set of illustrated guidelines titled “Guide to Payment Service in China”, (hereinafter the Guidelines) available in both Chinese and English.

These Guidelines represent the latest step in China’s ongoing effort to optimize payment services for foreign visitors, underscoring policymakers’ dedication to addressing difficulties international users face on the mainland.

Recognizing the importance of inclusivity in payment services, the Guidelines aim to address these barriers by advocating for broader accessibility to cater to diverse consumers’ needs. To successfully achieve this goal, a concerted effort among authorities is crucial to promote the acceptance of foreign bank cards, ensure the use of cash, improve mobile payment convenience, further protect consumers’ rights to choose payment methods and optimize account services.

In this article, the key directives outlined in the Guidelines will be presented, along with their implications on foreigners’ payment experience.

In recent years, China has witnessed a radical change in payment habits. Mobile payments, in particular, registered a significant surge in popularity among locals, with 86 percent of consumers embracing digital wallets such as Alipay and WeChat Pay as their preferred payment method, as these were considered more efficient and convenient.

Amid this digital transformation, traditional payment methods, meaning bank cards and cash, declined in popularity. Many establishments, accustomed to the efficiency of digital transactions, have been reported to even refuse to accept RMB cash, while also not accommodating international cards. These conditions already set a great barrier for international visitors.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Trends and Future Prospects of Bilateral Direct Investment between China and Germany

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China and Germany experienced a decline in direct investment in 2023 due to global economic uncertainty and policy changes. Despite this, China remains an attractive destination for German FDI. Key industries like automotive and advanced manufacturing continue to draw investors, although FDI outflows from Germany to China decreased by 30% in the first three quarters of 2023. Despite this, the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21% in the same period according to MOFCOM. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data and MOFCOM’s actual use of foreign capital provide different perspectives on the investment trends between the two countries.


Direct investment between China and Germany declined in 2023, due to a range of factors from global economic uncertainty to policy changes. However, China remains an important destination for German foreign direct investment (FDI), and key industries in both countries continue to excite investors. We look at the latest direct investment data between Germany and China to analyze the latest trends and discuss key factors that could shape future business and commercial ties.

Direct investment between China and Germany has undergone profound changes over the past decade. An increasingly complex investment environment for companies in both countries has led to falling two-way FDI figures in the first three quarters of 2023, in stark contrast to positive trends seen in 2022.

At the same time, industries with high growth potential, such as automotive and advanced manufacturing, continue to attract German companies to China, and high levels of reinvested earnings suggest established firms are doubling down on their commitments in the Chinese market. In Germany, the potential for electric vehicle (EV) sales is buoying otherwise low investment among Chinese companies.

According to data from Deutsche Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, total FDI outflows from Germany to China fell in the first three quarters of 2023, declining by 30 percent to a total of EUR 7.98 billion.

This is a marked reversal of trends from 2022, when FDI flows from Germany to China reached a record EUR 11.4 billion, up 14.7 percent year-on-year.

However, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the actual use of foreign capital from Germany to China increased by 21 percent year-on-year in the first eight months of 2023. The Deutsche Bundesbank’s FDI data, which follows standards set by the IMF, the OECD, and the European Central Bank (ECB), includes a broader scope of transactions within its direct investment data, including, broadly, direct investment positions, direct investment income flows, and direct investment financial flows.

Meanwhile, the actual use of foreign capital recorded by MOFCOM includes contracted foreign capital that has been concluded, including the registered and working capital paid by foreign investors, as well as the transaction consideration paid for the transferred equity of domestic investors.

This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.

China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.

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Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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China’s coast guard on Saturday fired a water cannon at a Philippine supply boat in disputed waters in the South China Sea, causing “significant damages to the vessel” and injuring its crew, the Philippine coast guard said.

Manila was attempting to resupply troops stationed on a ship at the Second Thomas Shoal, known locally as Ayungin Shoal, when the Chinese coast guard and maritime militia “harassed, blocked, deployed water cannons, and executed dangerous maneuvers against the routine RoRe (rotation and resupply) mission,” said the Philippine National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea.

The West Philippine Sea is the part of the South China Sea that Manila claims as its jurisdiction.

The Chinese coast guard also set up “a floating barrier” to block access to shoal where Manila ran aground an old warship, BRP Sierra Madre, to serve as a military outpost.

The Philippine task force condemned China’s “unprovoked aggression, coercion, and dangerous maneuvers.”

Philippines’ RoRe missions have been regularly blocked by China’s coast guard, but this is the first time a barrier was set up near the shoal. 

The Philippine coast guard nevertheless claimed that the mission on Saturday was accomplished.

Potential consequences

The Second Thomas Shoal lies within the country’s exclusive economic zone where Manila holds sovereign rights. 

China, however, claims historic rights over most of the South China Sea, including the Spratly archipelago, which the shoal forms a part of.

A Chinese foreign ministry’s spokesperson on Saturday said the Philippine supply vessel “intruded” into the waters near the shoal, called Ren’ai Jiao in Chinese, “without permission from the Chinese government.”

“China coast guard took necessary measures at sea in accordance with law to safeguard China’s rights, firmly obstructed the Philippines’ vessels, and foiled the Philippines’ attempt,” the ministry said.

“If the Philippines insists on going its own way, China will continue to adopt resolute measures,” the spokesperson said, warning that Manila “should be prepared to bear all potential consequences.”

Chinese Maritime Militia vessels near the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, March 5, 2024. (Adrian Portugal/Reuters)

U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson wrote on social media platform X that her country “stands with the Philippines” against China’s maneuvers.

Beijing’s “interference with the Philippines’ freedom of navigation violates international law and threatens a free and open Indo-Pacific,” she wrote.

Australian Ambassador to the Philippines Hae Kyong Yu also said that Canberra shares the Philippines’ “serious concerns about dangerous conduct by China’s vessels adjacent to Second Thomas Shoal.” 

“This is part of a pattern of deeply concerning behavior,” Yu wrote on X.

Edited by Jim Snyder.

Read the rest of this article here >>> Manila blasts China’s ‘unprovoked aggression’ in latest South China Sea incident

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