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Asean

China needs to get the integration ball moving

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Author: Jan Fidrmuc, Brunel University

Despite China’s history of experimenting with new policies and the economic liberalisation since the late 1980s, China is still only a partially integrated economy. This has caused regional divergence and inequality. Now, as the Chinese economy begins to slow down, prospects of further regional divergence are troubling and have a greater chance of exacerbating political tensions.

Residents visit a street market in Gujiao in northern China's Shanxi province. From coal country to the export-driven manufacturing heartland of China’s southeast, millions of people are enduring wrenching economic change. (Photo: AAP).

During the last six and half decades, Chinese society and its economy have undergone momentous changes. The scale and pace of change were truly unprecedented. One Chinese generation wore Mao suits, rode bicycles and never dreamed of ever travelling abroad (or if so, then only to North Korea or Albania). Their children wear business suits and drive cars. And their grandchildren live in a China whose average income is almost thirty times higher than what it was in 1980.

The process of economic decentralisation first began under Mao Zedong, who actively encouraged regional leaders to compete with each other in output (reported, if not actually produced). Deng Xiaoping’s efforts to reform and liberalise the economy continued this trend. At first, reforms were limited to only a handful of special economic zones such as Shenzhen. But when liberalisation was extended to the rest of the country, its progress was uneven: the coastal provinces charged ahead while the rest of the country followed at a slower pace.

But how did these momentous changes affect economic integration among Chinese provinces?

An instructive manifestation of economic integration is the degree of synchronisation of business cycles among provinces. In a closely integrated economy, most regions experience similar output shocks. As a result, business cycles would move in sync most of the time. That is important, as regions with closely synchronised business cycles would tend to agree on what kind of policy — either contraction or expansion — is required at any point in time. The recent political turmoil in the Eurozone demonstrates what happens when such synchronisation is lacking.

The output shocks can be further decomposed into supply shocks (which affect both output and price level permanently) and demand shocks (which have only a temporary effect on output but a permanent effect on the price level). Over the last 60 years, the correlations of output shocks have changed over time, but the two kinds of shocks have moved in opposite directions. Cross-province correlations between demand shocks suggest provinces have become more integrated over time. But supply shocks suggest provincial economies have been diverging.

Exposure to international trade and foreign investment played crucial roles in driving the growth of the Chinese economy in the past three decades. But the benefits from external economic ties were largely limited to provinces that are engaged in international trade or receive foreign investment. Hence, external engines of growth do not make demand or supply shocks spill over across provinces. Instead, it turns out that inter-provincial trade and factors of production were the main drivers of shock similarity.

China is thus still only a partially integrated economy. As supply shocks have permanent effects on output, their divergence could be a reason to worry. If they continue to diverge, even wider gaps may emerge between China’s regions. The limited role that external economic factors have in spreading shocks across China means that they may be contributing to regional asymmetries. Domestic factors — such as the hukou system of household registration — may have also contributed to supply shocks diverging.

History shows that countries stricken by growing economic disparities can develop important political tensions. For most countries, an overwhelming sense of national identity and high degree of mobility of people can help overcome such tensions. But although 95 per cent of the Chinese population are Han Chinese, they often speak different dialects and have a strong sense of belonging to their region, rather than the nation at large. The restrictions on migration neither foster a notion of national identity nor encourage the effects of shocks to spread across regions.

The Chinese economy is starting to slow down. The well-off southeast Chinese may have been happy to some of their taxes to be used to cross-subsidise the poorer regions in central and western China while their own regions were getting more prosperous over time. But only time will tell whether they feel the same when growth stops.

Jan Fidrmuc is Senior Lecturer at the Department of Economics and Finance, Brunel University, UK.

This is a brief summary of an article published by the author in conjunction with Shuo Huang and Jarko Fidrmuc in the China Economic Review.

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China needs to get the integration ball moving

Asean

ASEAN weathering the COVID-19 typhoon

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Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc addresses a special video conference with leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), on the coronavirus disease (COVID-19), in Hanoi 14 April, 2020 (Photo:Reuters/Manan Vatsyayana).

Author: Sandra Seno-Alday, Sydney University

The roughly 20 typhoons that hit Southeast Asia each year pale in comparison to the impact on the region of COVID-19 — a storm of a very different sort striking not just Southeast Asia but the world.

 

Just how badly is the COVID-19 typhoon thrashing the region? And what might the post-crisis recovery and reconstruction look like? To answer these questions, it is necessary to investigate the strengths and vulnerabilities of Southeast Asia’s pre-COVID-19 economic infrastructure.

Understanding the structure of the region’s economic house requires going back to 1967, when Southeast Asian countries decided to pledge friendship to one another under the ASEAN framework. While other integrated regions such as NAFTA and the European Union have aggressively broken down trade barriers and significantly boosted intra-regional trade, ASEAN regional economic integration has chugged along slower.

Southeast Asian countries have not viewed trade between each other as a top priority. The trade agreements in the region have been forged around suggestions for ASEAN countries to lower tariffs on intra-regional trade to within a certain range and across limited industries. This has lowered but not eliminated barriers to intra-regional trade. Consequently, a relatively significant share of Southeast Asian trade is with countries outside the region. This active extra-regional engagement has resulted in ASEAN countries’ successful integration into global value chain networks.

A historically outward-facing region, in 2010 around 75 per cent of Southeast Asian commodity imports and exports came from countries outside of ASEAN. This share of extra-regional trade nudged closer to 80 per cent in 2018. This indicates that ASEAN’s global value chain network embeddedness has deepened over time.

Around 40 per cent of ASEAN’s extra-regional trade is with the rest of Asia. From 2010 to 2018 Southeast Asian countries forged major trade relationships with four Asian countries: China, Japan, South Korea and India. Outside Asia, the United States is the region’s major trading partner. ASEAN’s trade focus on Asia’s largest markets is not surprising. Countries tend to establish trade relationships with large, geographically close, and culturally similar markets.

Fostering deep relationships with a few large markets, however, is a double-edged sword. While it has allowed ASEAN to benefit from integration in global value chains, it has also resulted in increased vulnerability to the shocks affecting its network connections.

ASEAN’s participation in global value chains has allowed it to transition from a net regional importer in 1990 to a net regional exporter in 2018. But the region’s deep embeddedness in a small and tightly-coupled network cluster of extra-regional global value chain partners has exposed it to disruption to any and all of its external partners. By contrast, ASEAN’s intra-regional trade network structure is much more loosely-coupled: a consequence of persistent intra-regional trade barriers and thus lower intra-regional trade intensity.

In the pre-COVID-19 period, ASEAN built for itself an economic house held up by just five extra-regional markets, while doing less to expand and diversify its intra-regional trade network. The data shows that ASEAN trade became increasingly concentrated in these few external markets between 2010 and 2018.

This dependence on a handful of markets does not bode well for risk and crisis management. All of the region’s major trading partners have been significantly affected by COVID-19 and this in turn is blowing the ASEAN economic house down.

What are the ways forward? The immediate task at hand is to get a better picture of the region’s position in global value chain networks and to get on top of managing its network risk exposure. Already there are red flags around the region’s food security arising from its position in food value chains. It is critical to look for ways to introduce flexibility into existing supply chains for greater agility in responding to crises.

It is also an opportune time for ASEAN to harness the technology transfer gains of global value chain participation and invest in innovation-driven diversification of products and markets. The region’s embeddedness in global value chain networks certainly places it in a strong position to readily access large export markets not just in Asia but also Europe and the Americas.

Over the longer term, ASEAN is faced with the question of whether it should seriously look…

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Tiger Trade Launches SGX Trading, Meeting Demand from Asian Investors

Access to the Singapore Exchange (SGX) adds to Tiger Brokers’ current menu of stock exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Nasdaq Stock Market (NASDAQ), the world’s two largest stock exchanges, as well as the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX).

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SINGAPORE (ACN Newswire) – Tiger Trade, a one-stop mobile and online trading application by Tiger Brokers, has launched access to the Singapore Exchange (SGX).

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Asean

Can Asia maintain growth with an ever ageing population ?

To boost productivity in the future, Asian governments will have to implement well-targeted structural reforms today.

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Asia has been the world champion of economic growth for decades, and this year will be no exception. According to the latest International Monetary Fund Regional Economic Outlook(REO), the Asia-Pacific region’s GDP is projected to increase by 5.5% in 2017 and 5.4% in 2018. (more…)

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