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Asean

Rafale deal reveals India’s political and strategic priorities

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Author: James Boyers, London

In August 2007, India began a tender process to acquire 126 medium-range, multi-role jet fighters to replace its ageing Mirage fleet.

In late January, the Indian government announced it had chosen the French consortium-led Dassault Rafale over the UK–German consortium-led Eurofighter Typhoon as the preferred bidder in the tender process. India’s decision to select the Rafale over the Typhoon was met with disbelief in the UK and Germany — and triumphalism in France. Beyond dividing European neighbours, the Indian government’s decision also provides a sharp insight into the country’s current political situation and its strategic priorities.

The contract for the fighters is estimated to be worth US$10.6 billion. Given the economic conditions across Europe, and particularly in the UK, securing the contract was seen as a national priority. The UK’s economy remains largely stagnant with growth of only 0.9 per cent in 2011, while unemployment increased to 8.4 per cent. And in the final quarter of 2011, national GDP contracted by 0.2 per cent and manufacturing declined by 0.9 per cent. Moreover, the Conservative government has pledged to dramatically reduce defence spending, with severe impacts on the local defence industry. In 2011, the government ended development and production of the Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft and retired the Harrier fleet. Final assembly of the Typhoon takes place in the UK and over a third of the parts are sourced within the UK. So obtaining a contract to export the Typhoon to India would have provided a significant boost to the national economy, particularly in the hard-hit manufacturing and defence sectors.

The deal to produce the fighters also has significant political ramifications. In 2010, David Cameron led a highly publicised government and business delegation to India, and has often cited increased trade with India as a means of reinvigorating the national economy. In France, current polls predict defeat for President Sarkozy in the April presidential election after a downgrade in the country’s credit ratings, sluggish economic growth and persistently high unemployment. And in India, the national government — led by Manmohan Singh — has been embroiled in significant corruption scandals, including the sale of government telecommunications licences and procurement contracts related to the hosting of the 2010 Commonwealth Games.

It was this final consideration which appears to have determined the tender in favour of the Rafale. Throughout the bidding process, India’s Ministry of Defence emphasised that price would be the most important factor in its decision. Immediately after the January announcement, it was widely reported that Dassault was preferred because it was the lowest bidder for the contract. Jane’s reported that the Rafale was quoted to be 15–17 per cent cheaper than the Typhoon, with the individual unit cost US$5 million less for the Rafale. While the Eurofighter consortium believes the Typhoon is the superior aircraft, the two fighters’ combat performance was deemed to be equivalent, with the Rafale having performed particularly well in the ground-attack role during NATO’s offensive in Libya. Additionally, the Rafale would include complete and advanced radar and avionics capability. On balance, the decision appears to be on the merits of the tenders rather than any corrupt interference.

The decision to purchase the Rafale also provides insight into India’s strategic priorities. In April 2011, the Ministry of Defence rejected bids from US firms Lockheed and Boeing, which offered the F-16 Fighting Falcon and F/A-18 Hornet, respectively. The rejection was consistent with the Indian government’s refusal to sign arms-transfer agreements with the US, which meant recent aircraft sales have been made without avionics equipment, vital to fighter jet operations. The decision to choose the Rafale also follows a 2011 agreement with France to upgrade its remaining Mirage fighters and purchase French manufactured air-to-air missiles, and a 2005 order of six French-built Scorpene submarines. Together, these agreements have made France the second-largest supplier of defence materiel to India. Outside of military relations, the deal furthers the increasing bilateral ties between India and France. In 2008 the two countries agreed to a major nuclear deal whereby France accepted to enter into nuclear-energy collaboration with India and provide access to technologies and fuel. In the same year, the two leaders held bilateral visits, with a goal to double bilateral trade between 2010 and 2012.

India’s decision to choose the Rafale over the Typhoon surprised and disappointed many in the UK, but appears to have been made on the merits of each tender. Moreover, the decision to preference a French bid is consistent with India’s history of non-alignment and a strengthening bilateral relationship between the two countries.

James Boyers completed an Honours degree, majoring in political science, at the Australian National University in 2011. He is currently interning with a public-affairs organisation in London. 

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Rafale deal reveals India’s political and strategic priorities

Asean

ASEAN weathering the COVID-19 typhoon

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Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc addresses a special video conference with leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), on the coronavirus disease (COVID-19), in Hanoi 14 April, 2020 (Photo:Reuters/Manan Vatsyayana).

Author: Sandra Seno-Alday, Sydney University

The roughly 20 typhoons that hit Southeast Asia each year pale in comparison to the impact on the region of COVID-19 — a storm of a very different sort striking not just Southeast Asia but the world.

 

Just how badly is the COVID-19 typhoon thrashing the region? And what might the post-crisis recovery and reconstruction look like? To answer these questions, it is necessary to investigate the strengths and vulnerabilities of Southeast Asia’s pre-COVID-19 economic infrastructure.

Understanding the structure of the region’s economic house requires going back to 1967, when Southeast Asian countries decided to pledge friendship to one another under the ASEAN framework. While other integrated regions such as NAFTA and the European Union have aggressively broken down trade barriers and significantly boosted intra-regional trade, ASEAN regional economic integration has chugged along slower.

Southeast Asian countries have not viewed trade between each other as a top priority. The trade agreements in the region have been forged around suggestions for ASEAN countries to lower tariffs on intra-regional trade to within a certain range and across limited industries. This has lowered but not eliminated barriers to intra-regional trade. Consequently, a relatively significant share of Southeast Asian trade is with countries outside the region. This active extra-regional engagement has resulted in ASEAN countries’ successful integration into global value chain networks.

A historically outward-facing region, in 2010 around 75 per cent of Southeast Asian commodity imports and exports came from countries outside of ASEAN. This share of extra-regional trade nudged closer to 80 per cent in 2018. This indicates that ASEAN’s global value chain network embeddedness has deepened over time.

Around 40 per cent of ASEAN’s extra-regional trade is with the rest of Asia. From 2010 to 2018 Southeast Asian countries forged major trade relationships with four Asian countries: China, Japan, South Korea and India. Outside Asia, the United States is the region’s major trading partner. ASEAN’s trade focus on Asia’s largest markets is not surprising. Countries tend to establish trade relationships with large, geographically close, and culturally similar markets.

Fostering deep relationships with a few large markets, however, is a double-edged sword. While it has allowed ASEAN to benefit from integration in global value chains, it has also resulted in increased vulnerability to the shocks affecting its network connections.

ASEAN’s participation in global value chains has allowed it to transition from a net regional importer in 1990 to a net regional exporter in 2018. But the region’s deep embeddedness in a small and tightly-coupled network cluster of extra-regional global value chain partners has exposed it to disruption to any and all of its external partners. By contrast, ASEAN’s intra-regional trade network structure is much more loosely-coupled: a consequence of persistent intra-regional trade barriers and thus lower intra-regional trade intensity.

In the pre-COVID-19 period, ASEAN built for itself an economic house held up by just five extra-regional markets, while doing less to expand and diversify its intra-regional trade network. The data shows that ASEAN trade became increasingly concentrated in these few external markets between 2010 and 2018.

This dependence on a handful of markets does not bode well for risk and crisis management. All of the region’s major trading partners have been significantly affected by COVID-19 and this in turn is blowing the ASEAN economic house down.

What are the ways forward? The immediate task at hand is to get a better picture of the region’s position in global value chain networks and to get on top of managing its network risk exposure. Already there are red flags around the region’s food security arising from its position in food value chains. It is critical to look for ways to introduce flexibility into existing supply chains for greater agility in responding to crises.

It is also an opportune time for ASEAN to harness the technology transfer gains of global value chain participation and invest in innovation-driven diversification of products and markets. The region’s embeddedness in global value chain networks certainly places it in a strong position to readily access large export markets not just in Asia but also Europe and the Americas.

Over the longer term, ASEAN is faced with the question of whether it should seriously look…

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Tiger Trade Launches SGX Trading, Meeting Demand from Asian Investors

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SINGAPORE (ACN Newswire) – Tiger Trade, a one-stop mobile and online trading application by Tiger Brokers, has launched access to the Singapore Exchange (SGX).

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Asean

Can Asia maintain growth with an ever ageing population ?

To boost productivity in the future, Asian governments will have to implement well-targeted structural reforms today.

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Asia has been the world champion of economic growth for decades, and this year will be no exception. According to the latest International Monetary Fund Regional Economic Outlook(REO), the Asia-Pacific region’s GDP is projected to increase by 5.5% in 2017 and 5.4% in 2018. (more…)

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