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Asean

Measuring the impact of the earthquake on Japan’s economy

Author: Huw McKay, Westpac and ANU The great misfortune of Japan’s earthquake will shape the contours of economic activity in the country for some time to come. Japanese private sector estimates of the economic cost are centring on 3 per cent of GDP. Those estimates are split roughly half and half between the damage bill and the anticipated activity loss. This essay is not intended to critique the efforts of the forecasting community at this difficult time. Rather, it is to trace the thought processes involved in looking at such a disaster, and to make some observations about the future position of the Japanese economy at various horizons . Turning to the immediate future, activity losses will be spread across all areas of the economy , but will be most visible in industrial production, logistics, utilities, household services and international trade. A proportion of these impacts can be sensibly proxied by an estimate of the short-term decline in hours worked. Around half a million are homeless and are unlikely to be in a position to work for at least a month . The direct negative impact on labour supply from this unfortunate group can be estimated (callous as it is to do so) by scaling the 500,000 to garner their relationship to the labour force. Multiplying that result by measured productivity levels produces an estimated output loss of 0.024 per cent of GDP per month or 0.006 per cent of GDP per week. In addition, power shortages will constrain the capital-intensive sectors. In addition to Tohoku, there is the impact of rolling blackouts on Kanto, where TEPCO, the unhappy owner of the compromised Fukushima nuclear facilities , rules the roost. One month of power disruptions to both Kanto and Tohoku might come in close to a loss of 0.08 per cent of GDP. Offsets to these losses will be available via increased hours worked in other parts of the country and the diversion of orders to factories in other regions running on full power. In some cases, these offsets could be considerable, especially in sectors where capacity utilisation is presently low and the production process in question is not highly specialised. As a large segment of Japanese manufacturing does not meet both of those criteria, it seems unwise to get overly excited about a drastic reorientation in the very short term. In terms of international trade, affected ports process less than 1.5 per cent of Japan’s exports and a little over 2 per cent of imports. This factor is most likely to manifest as sectoral dislocations rather than as negative outcomes of aggregate note. On that point, the range of industries that have been hit hard includes non-ferrous metals, specialty machinery, electronics and auto components, rubber, medical equipment and brewing. Downstream producers relying on inputs from these factories will see the supply chain disrupted for some time. This will in turn disturb wholesale distribution networks around the world, with an eventual impact on shop shelves and retail showrooms. The potential horrors of exposure to nuclear radiation will have a profound impact on consumer behaviour while the danger is perceived to exist. Until the scare dissipates, consumers living within a plausible radius — including Tokyo — are expected to eschew discretionary outings. That implies a precipitate drop in spending on travel, restaurants and other forms of extra-domicile recreation. The impact may be similar to the behaviour observed during cases of viral outbreak, where socialisation temporarily falls toward zero. Here, consumers are shunning the atmosphere, not just groups of people, so the temporary effect could be greater. Turning to the reconstruction phase, local estimates of the monetary cost of rebuilding, spread over two years, would add between 0.125 per cent and 0.25 per cent to activity levels per quarter above any prior baseline. A little less than 70,000 buildings have been damaged, while a further 10,000 have fully or partially collapsed. Looking specifically at the dwelling stock, the Tohoku region has significantly different fundamentals from the national average. The number of persons per dwelling is higher in Tohoku (2.5 versus 2.2 nationally) the average floor space of dwellings is larger (124sqm versus 107sqm nationally) and the proportion of detached dwellings is higher (72 per cent versus 55 per cent nationally). Also, a greater share of Tohoku’s dwellings are wooden (51 per cent versus 32 per cent nationally) or were constructed before 1980 (37 per cent versus 32 per cent nationally), and are thus more likely to suffer critical damage. Rates of owner occupation are considerably higher than elsewhere in Japan (65 per cent across Tohoku versus 51 per cent nationally) despite a persistently higher unemployment rate in the region (5.2 per cent average for the last decade versus 4.7 per cent nationally). Each of these characteristics is relevant for the scale, style, financing and timing of the rebuild. All things considered, the reconstruction of the dwelling stock will be a more protracted process in Tohoku than it would be in the ‘average’ prefecture. As for the energy sector, Japan went into this disaster with a glut of power capacity, having over-invested in prior decades when long run demand projections were rosier. Therefore, it is unlikely that all of the lost capacity will be replaced. A shift in the energy mix away from nuclear capacity can be anticipated, but that might also come from more intensive use of existing infrastructure. In terms of raw material demand, a shift toward conventional fuels and away from nuclear would be expected to benefit LNG, coal and oil, in that order, with Japan’s carbon emissions profile a casualty of the shift. A factor for the medium and long term is whether the Tohoku can hang onto its high-tech manufacturing and components base. The Chinese rare earth embargo severely constrained many firms in the tech arena. Many will be confronting a forced re-location decision in the wake of the disaster. A further wave of hollowing out, directly or indirectly related to the disaster, would be a negative for Japan’s future prospects. The net impact of the near term losses and the gains of the reconstruction phase will leave the level of activity at the end of 2012 just a little below what was anticipated in a pre-disaster baseline. Japan accounts for a little over 5 per cent of PPP World GDP and therefore it contributes around 0.1percentage points to world growth when it expands at its potential rate. Prior to the shock, it was expected to quietly add 0.09ppts in 2011 and 0.12ppts in 2012. The new growth profile alters that to 0.06ppts and 0.14ppts respectively. Huw McKay is Senior International Economist at Westpac Banking Corporation and a graduate scholar at the ANU. Japan’s earthquake and its economic impact The political and policy fall-out from the Japanese earthquake and tsunami Japan’s big society: a Chinese perspective on the earthquake

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Author: Huw McKay, Westpac and ANU

The great misfortune of Japan’s earthquake will shape the contours of economic activity in the country for some time to come.

Japanese private sector estimates of the economic cost are centring on 3 per cent of GDP. Those estimates are split roughly half and half between the damage bill and the anticipated activity loss. This essay is not intended to critique the efforts of the forecasting community at this difficult time. Rather, it is to trace the thought processes involved in looking at such a disaster, and to make some observations about the future position of the Japanese economy at various horizons.

Turning to the immediate future, activity losses will be spread across all areas of the economy, but will be most visible in industrial production, logistics, utilities, household services and international trade. A proportion of these impacts can be sensibly proxied by an estimate of the short-term decline in hours worked.

Around half a million are homeless and are unlikely to be in a position to work for at least a month. The direct negative impact on labour supply from this unfortunate group can be estimated (callous as it is to do so) by scaling the 500,000 to garner their relationship to the labour force. Multiplying that result by measured productivity levels produces an estimated output loss of 0.024 per cent of GDP per month or 0.006 per cent of GDP per week.

In addition, power shortages will constrain the capital-intensive sectors. In addition to Tohoku, there is the impact of rolling blackouts on Kanto, where TEPCO, the unhappy owner of the compromised Fukushima nuclear facilities, rules the roost. One month of power disruptions to both Kanto and Tohoku might come in close to a loss of 0.08 per cent of GDP.

Offsets to these losses will be available via increased hours worked in other parts of the country and the diversion of orders to factories in other regions running on full power. In some cases, these offsets could be considerable, especially in sectors where capacity utilisation is presently low and the production process in question is not highly specialised. As a large segment of Japanese manufacturing does not meet both of those criteria, it seems unwise to get overly excited about a drastic reorientation in the very short term.

In terms of international trade, affected ports process less than 1.5 per cent of Japan’s exports and a little over 2 per cent of imports. This factor is most likely to manifest as sectoral dislocations rather than as negative outcomes of aggregate note. On that point, the range of industries that have been hit hard includes non-ferrous metals, specialty machinery, electronics and auto components, rubber, medical equipment and brewing. Downstream producers relying on inputs from these factories will see the supply chain disrupted for some time. This will in turn disturb wholesale distribution networks around the world, with an eventual impact on shop shelves and retail showrooms.

The potential horrors of exposure to nuclear radiation will have a profound impact on consumer behaviour while the danger is perceived to exist. Until the scare dissipates, consumers living within a plausible radius — including Tokyo — are expected to eschew discretionary outings. That implies a precipitate drop in spending on travel, restaurants and other forms of extra-domicile recreation. The impact may be similar to the behaviour observed during cases of viral outbreak, where socialisation temporarily falls toward zero. Here, consumers are shunning the atmosphere, not just groups of people, so the temporary effect could be greater.

Turning to the reconstruction phase, local estimates of the monetary cost of rebuilding, spread over two years, would add between 0.125 per cent and 0.25 per cent to activity levels per quarter above any prior baseline. A little less than 70,000 buildings have been damaged, while a further 10,000 have fully or partially collapsed. Looking specifically at the dwelling stock, the Tohoku region has significantly different fundamentals from the national average. The number of persons per dwelling is higher in Tohoku (2.5 versus 2.2 nationally) the average floor space of dwellings is larger (124sqm versus 107sqm nationally) and the proportion of detached dwellings is higher (72 per cent versus 55 per cent nationally). Also, a greater share of Tohoku’s dwellings are wooden (51 per cent versus 32 per cent nationally) or were constructed before 1980 (37 per cent versus 32 per cent nationally), and are thus more likely to suffer critical damage. Rates of owner occupation are considerably higher than elsewhere in Japan (65 per cent across Tohoku versus 51 per cent nationally) despite a persistently higher unemployment rate in the region (5.2 per cent average for the last decade versus 4.7 per cent nationally).

Each of these characteristics is relevant for the scale, style, financing and timing of the rebuild. All things considered, the reconstruction of the dwelling stock will be a more protracted process in Tohoku than it would be in the ‘average’ prefecture.

As for the energy sector, Japan went into this disaster with a glut of power capacity, having over-invested in prior decades when long run demand projections were rosier. Therefore, it is unlikely that all of the lost capacity will be replaced. A shift in the energy mix away from nuclear capacity can be anticipated, but that might also come from more intensive use of existing infrastructure. In terms of raw material demand, a shift toward conventional fuels and away from nuclear would be expected to benefit LNG, coal and oil, in that order, with Japan’s carbon emissions profile a casualty of the shift.

A factor for the medium and long term is whether the Tohoku can hang onto its high-tech manufacturing and components base. The Chinese rare earth embargo severely constrained many firms in the tech arena. Many will be confronting a forced re-location decision in the wake of the disaster. A further wave of hollowing out, directly or indirectly related to the disaster, would be a negative for Japan’s future prospects.

The net impact of the near term losses and the gains of the reconstruction phase will leave the level of activity at the end of 2012 just a little below what was anticipated in a pre-disaster baseline. Japan accounts for a little over 5 per cent of PPP World GDP and therefore it contributes around 0.1percentage points to world growth when it expands at its potential rate. Prior to the shock, it was expected to quietly add 0.09ppts in 2011 and 0.12ppts in 2012. The new growth profile alters that to 0.06ppts and 0.14ppts respectively.

Huw McKay is Senior International Economist at Westpac Banking Corporation and a graduate scholar at the ANU.

  1. Japan’s earthquake and its economic impact
  2. The political and policy fall-out from the Japanese earthquake and tsunami
  3. Japan’s big society: a Chinese perspective on the earthquake

Continued here:
Measuring the impact of the earthquake on Japan’s economy

Asean

ASEAN weathering the COVID-19 typhoon

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Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc addresses a special video conference with leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), on the coronavirus disease (COVID-19), in Hanoi 14 April, 2020 (Photo:Reuters/Manan Vatsyayana).

Author: Sandra Seno-Alday, Sydney University

The roughly 20 typhoons that hit Southeast Asia each year pale in comparison to the impact on the region of COVID-19 — a storm of a very different sort striking not just Southeast Asia but the world.

 

Just how badly is the COVID-19 typhoon thrashing the region? And what might the post-crisis recovery and reconstruction look like? To answer these questions, it is necessary to investigate the strengths and vulnerabilities of Southeast Asia’s pre-COVID-19 economic infrastructure.

Understanding the structure of the region’s economic house requires going back to 1967, when Southeast Asian countries decided to pledge friendship to one another under the ASEAN framework. While other integrated regions such as NAFTA and the European Union have aggressively broken down trade barriers and significantly boosted intra-regional trade, ASEAN regional economic integration has chugged along slower.

Southeast Asian countries have not viewed trade between each other as a top priority. The trade agreements in the region have been forged around suggestions for ASEAN countries to lower tariffs on intra-regional trade to within a certain range and across limited industries. This has lowered but not eliminated barriers to intra-regional trade. Consequently, a relatively significant share of Southeast Asian trade is with countries outside the region. This active extra-regional engagement has resulted in ASEAN countries’ successful integration into global value chain networks.

A historically outward-facing region, in 2010 around 75 per cent of Southeast Asian commodity imports and exports came from countries outside of ASEAN. This share of extra-regional trade nudged closer to 80 per cent in 2018. This indicates that ASEAN’s global value chain network embeddedness has deepened over time.

Around 40 per cent of ASEAN’s extra-regional trade is with the rest of Asia. From 2010 to 2018 Southeast Asian countries forged major trade relationships with four Asian countries: China, Japan, South Korea and India. Outside Asia, the United States is the region’s major trading partner. ASEAN’s trade focus on Asia’s largest markets is not surprising. Countries tend to establish trade relationships with large, geographically close, and culturally similar markets.

Fostering deep relationships with a few large markets, however, is a double-edged sword. While it has allowed ASEAN to benefit from integration in global value chains, it has also resulted in increased vulnerability to the shocks affecting its network connections.

ASEAN’s participation in global value chains has allowed it to transition from a net regional importer in 1990 to a net regional exporter in 2018. But the region’s deep embeddedness in a small and tightly-coupled network cluster of extra-regional global value chain partners has exposed it to disruption to any and all of its external partners. By contrast, ASEAN’s intra-regional trade network structure is much more loosely-coupled: a consequence of persistent intra-regional trade barriers and thus lower intra-regional trade intensity.

In the pre-COVID-19 period, ASEAN built for itself an economic house held up by just five extra-regional markets, while doing less to expand and diversify its intra-regional trade network. The data shows that ASEAN trade became increasingly concentrated in these few external markets between 2010 and 2018.

This dependence on a handful of markets does not bode well for risk and crisis management. All of the region’s major trading partners have been significantly affected by COVID-19 and this in turn is blowing the ASEAN economic house down.

What are the ways forward? The immediate task at hand is to get a better picture of the region’s position in global value chain networks and to get on top of managing its network risk exposure. Already there are red flags around the region’s food security arising from its position in food value chains. It is critical to look for ways to introduce flexibility into existing supply chains for greater agility in responding to crises.

It is also an opportune time for ASEAN to harness the technology transfer gains of global value chain participation and invest in innovation-driven diversification of products and markets. The region’s embeddedness in global value chain networks certainly places it in a strong position to readily access large export markets not just in Asia but also Europe and the Americas.

Over the longer term, ASEAN is faced with the question of whether it should seriously look…

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Asean

Can Asia maintain growth with an ever ageing population ?

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