China
The evolution of Sino–American competition in Myanmar
Author: Adam P. MacDonald, Halifax
For decades, China has been Myanmar’s principal international partner. In the years preceding Myanmar’s opening up, China dominated Myanmar’s foreign discourse as an important economic and military partner, and a source of international diplomatic protection due to the diplomatic isolation and widespread sanctions imposed on Myanmar by the West, especially after the 1988 coup. But it is inaccurate to portray the former military Junta as a completely submissive satellite of Beijing.
In the lead up to the transfer of power in 2010, China supported the reform process on the assumption that its dominant access and influence would remain largely undiminished. Yet the direction and intensity of internal reforms and the movement towards normalisation with Washington has caught Beijing off-guard.
In 2009, the Obama administration began a gradual recalibration of its Myanmar strategy towards opening limited and conditional diplomatic channels. Impressed by the level and commitment to widespread reforms, Washington drove headlong into a rapprochement with Naypyidaw by mid-2011. The United States (along with many Western partners) has not only restored full diplomatic relations but lifted most financial and investment restrictions, with the exception of targeted sanctions against certain persons, and sectors such as mining which are still largely controlled by the military. The importance of this new relationship was underscored by the reciprocal state visits made by President Thein Sein and President Obama in 2012 and 2013.
Washington’s re-engagement with Myanmar coincides with its Asian ‘pivot’ (now named ‘rebalance’) in foreign policy. Despite this, the Obama administration has repeatedly emphasised that its relations with Naypyidaw are grounded in a ‘principal policy’ conditioned on continued governance and human rights reforms and are not directed against China — though there is a convenient congruence between Washington’s promotion of democracy and human rights and its wider geopolitical goals of using Myanmar to extend influence in the region.
Beijing is not convinced. It views the United States’ Myanmar strategy as being directed at ensuring American primacy in the region at its expense. Myanmar is an important state to Beijing for many reasons, including the preservation of ethnic stability along the Chinese border; the large amount of in-country investment, especially in natural resources; the presence of a large Chinese diaspora community; and Myanmar’s strategic position within Southeast Asia adjacent to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.
Still, unlike its vocal criticism of Washington’s perceived interference in other regional matters such as maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas, Beijing has largely stayed silent on Naypyidaw’s new relations with Washington. Instead, it has embarked on its own recalibration strategy to adjust to the changing realities of Myanmar politics.
Beijing has begun to engage multiple actors beyond the military and Thein Sein government. These include the Union of Solidarity and Development Party and the National League of Democracy (NLD). Attempts to forge ties with the NLD have gathered pace with the recent visit of China’s Deputy Foreign Minister to NLD headquarters, in a move which perhaps paves the way for an eventual visit to China by Aung San Suu Kyi. This multi-pronged strategy demonstrates Beijing’s appreciation of the multi-polarity that defines Myanmar politics and its determination to interact with whichever entity is in power.
With Beijing positioning itself to work with any future government, it remains unclear the extent to which Washington will condition normalising relations on the attainment of a minimum level of compliance with democracy and human rights ideals. In light of the faltering constitutional amendment process, and the very real prospect of the military’s continued political involvement, Washington will have to balance its ‘principal policy’ with its wider geopolitical interests. In all likelihood, even if the 2015 elections do not meet Western standards of freedom and fairness, Washington will continue to deepen relations as long as there is no overt return to authoritarian rule.
Washington has begun to tentatively reach out to the Tatmadaw, allowing them observer status in the Southeast Asian military exercise Cobra Gold. Recent US State Department pronouncements have also suggested that, if reforms continue, arms sales to Myanmar are a real possibility. By building trust, contacts and relationships in Myanmar, these efforts will gradually dilute the Tatmadaw’s exclusive relationship with Beijing. This is a delicate process for the Tatmadaw: in many ways, it is still wary of Western intentions, and has maintained close military ties and arms sales with China. And although China accepts growing economic and political competition, any eroding of its strategic and military relations with Myanmar will most likely elicit a stronger reaction.
Beijing acknowledges the growing diversification of Myanmar’s foreign relations, but remains concerned about any moves of alignment towards the West. And at the same time as not wanting to be seen as a client of China, Naypyidaw also recognises the importance of maintaining relations with its giant neighbour and largest trading partner. As the ASEAN Chair, Naypyidaw will have to carefully navigate delicate matters such as competing maritime claims in the South China Sea between ASEAN members and China. This will test its ability to walk a sensitive geopolitical fault line. Washington will no doubt take note of its performance.
Ultimately, Myanmar is not just a bystander but is actively involved in maximising benefits from the growing competition between Beijing and Washington. Myanmar will most likely attempt to balance a neutral policy of non-alignment with both great powers. An important question in coming years is whether the wider geopolitical context will overshadow and lessen scrutiny over Myanmar’s continuation of democratic reform and national reconciliation.
Adam P MacDonald is an independent researcher based in Halifax, Canada.
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The evolution of Sino–American competition in Myanmar
China
Is journalist Vicky Xu preparing to return to China?
Chinese social media influencers have recently claimed that prominent Chinese-born Australian journalist Vicky Xu had posted a message saying she planned to return to China.
There is no evidence for this. The source did not provide evidence to support the claim, and Xu herself later confirmed to AFCL that she has no such plans.
Currently working as an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, or ASPI, Xu has previously written for both the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, or ABC, and The New York Times.
A Chinese language netizen on X initially claimed on March 31 that the changing geopolitical relations between Sydney and Beijing had caused Xu to become an expendable asset and that she had posted a message expressing a strong desire to return to China. An illegible, blurred photo of the supposed message accompanied the post.
This claim was retweeted by a widely followed influencer on the popular Chinese social media site Weibo one day later, who additionally commented that Xu was a “traitor” who had been abandoned by Australian media.
Following the publication of an ASPI article in 2021 which exposed forced labor conditions in Xinjiang co-authored by Xu, the journalist was labeled “morally bankrupt” and “anti-China” by the Chinese state owned media outlet Global Times and subjected to an influx of threatening messages and digital abuse, eventually forcing her to temporarily close several of her social media accounts.
AFCL found that neither Xu’s active X nor LinkedIn account has any mention of her supposed return to China, and received the following response from Xu herself about the rumor:
“I can confirm that I don’t have plans to go back to China. I think if I do go back I’ll most definitely be detained or imprisoned – so the only career I’ll be having is probably going to be prison labor or something like that, which wouldn’t be ideal.”
Neither a keyword search nor reverse image search on the photo attached to the original X post turned up any text from Xu supporting the netizens’ claims.
Translated by Shen Ke. Edited by Shen Ke and Malcolm Foster.
Asia Fact Check Lab (AFCL) was established to counter disinformation in today’s complex media environment. We publish fact-checks, media-watches and in-depth reports that aim to sharpen and deepen our readers’ understanding of current affairs and public issues. If you like our content, you can also follow us on Facebook, Instagram and X.
Read the rest of this article here >>> Is journalist Vicky Xu preparing to return to China?
China
Guide for Foreign Residents: Obtaining a Certificate of No Criminal Record in China
Foreign residents in China can request a criminal record check from their local security bureau. This certificate may be required for visa applications or job opportunities. Requirements and procedures vary by city. In Shanghai, foreigners must have lived there for 180 days with a valid visa to obtain the certificate.
Foreign residents living in China can request a criminal record check from the local security bureau in the city in which they have lived for at least 180 days. Certificates of no criminal record may be required for people leaving China, or those who are starting a new position in China and applying for a new visa or residence permit. Taking Shanghai as an example, we outline the requirements for obtaining a China criminal record check.
Securing a Certificate of No Criminal Record, often referred to as a criminal record or criminal background check, is a crucial step for various employment opportunities, as well as visa applications and residency permits in China. Nevertheless, navigating the process can be a daunting task due to bureaucratic procedures and language barriers.
In this article, we use Shanghai as an example to explore the essential information and steps required to successfully obtain a no-criminal record check. Requirements and procedures may differ in other cities and counties in China.
Note that foreigners who are not currently living in China and need a criminal record check to apply for a Chinese visa must obtain the certificate from their country of residence or nationality, and have it notarized by a Chinese embassy or consulate in that country.
Foreigners who have a valid residence permit and have lived in Shanghai for at least 180 days can request a criminal record check in the city. This means that the applicant will also need to currently have a work, study, or other form of visa or stay permit that allows them to live in China long-term.
If a foreigner has lived in another part of China and is planning to or has recently moved to Shanghai, they will need to request a criminal record check in the place where they previously spent at least 180 days.
There are two steps to obtaining a criminal record certificate in Shanghai: requesting the criminal record check from the Public Security Bureau (PSB) and getting the resulting Certificate of No Criminal Record notarized by an authorized notary agency.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
China
China Unveils Plan to Upgrade Industrial Equipment
China unveiled a comprehensive action plan for upgrading industrial equipment, with a focus on driving technological innovation and economic growth. The plan, released on April 9, 2024, aims to enhance competitiveness and sustainability within the manufacturing sector through extensive investment and regulatory support.
China announced an ambitious action plan for industrial equipment upgrading, which aims to drive technological innovation and economic growth through extensive investment and regulatory support.
On April 9, 2024, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and six other departments jointly released a notice introducing the Implementation Plan for Promoting Equipment Renewal in the Industrial Sector (hereafter referred to as the “action plan”).
Finalized earlier on March 23, 2024, this comprehensive action plan addresses critical issues related to technological innovation and economic development. It reflects China’s proactive stance in enhancing competitiveness and sustainability within its manufacturing sector. The initiative underscores the recognition of industrial equipment upgrading as a top policy priority.
The scope of China’s action plan to upgrade industrial equipment in manufacturing, is extensive, covering various aspects such as:
In line with China’s ambitious goals for industrial modernization and sustainable development, the action plan outlines several key objectives aimed at driving substantial advancements in the industrial sector by 2027.
These objectives encompass a wide range of areas, from increasing investment to enhancing digitalization and promoting innovation, including:
The objectives and key actions proposed in the action plan are summarized below.
This article is republished from China Briefing. Read the rest of the original article.
China Briefing is written and produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The practice assists foreign investors into China and has done since 1992 through offices in Beijing, Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Suzhou, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Please contact the firm for assistance in China at china@dezshira.com.
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