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Asean

The Dokdo/Takeshima dispute and its implications for Australia

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Author: Jeffrey Choi, ANU

During the recent APEC Summit in Russia, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda faced each other amidst tension over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islets in the Sea of Japan/East Sea.

Both sides have been locked in a heated diplomatic conflict since Lee’s surprise visit to the disputed islets on 10 August. Nevertheless, in a short, unofficial meeting on the sidelines of the APEC Summit, Lee and Noda agreed to work toward future-oriented bilateral relations. Their conversations followed urging from US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to ‘lower the temperature and work together in a concerted way to have a calm and restrained approach’ to the issue.

On the surface, tempers between the two American allies over the disputed islets appear to be cooling. But, a closer look reveals a complex tangle of political, economic, historical, legal, geographical and emotional issues, and it is clear that there is no silver bullet to solve the dispute. Still, it is a welcome development that the US, which has maintained a neutral, hands-off position on the issue for decades, is seemingly willing to discuss it. America has recently paid renewed attention to the region under its ‘pivot to Asia’ to counterbalance the rapid rise of Chinese power. Under current circumstances, the US has a strong interest in reinforcing its relations with existing allies in the region and promoting trilateral cooperation between South Korea, Japan and the US. The US is unlikely to show much patience if relations between South Korea and Japan continue to deteriorate in the face of Chinese advancement in the region.

Australia is not immune to these tensions. Australia has similar strategic interests in the region, which could be harmed by the current tensions between South Korea and Japan. South Korea is Australia’s fourth-largest trading partner and the third-largest export destination for Australian commodities. Japan is the second-largest export destination for Australian commodities and the largest surplus-producing trading partner to Australia. Australia shares democratic and free-market values and a history of close cooperation on many regional and international issues with both South Korea and Japan, including concern over North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons. Any escalation of tensions between South Korea and Japan could potentially undermine goodwill built up over time by Australia with both countries.

So what can be done? On the one hand, Japan started to publicly claim sovereignty over the islets amidst re-emergence of nationalism in North East Asia in the post-Cold War period. On the other hand, Korea has emphasised that Dokdo was a victim of Japanese imperialism at the time of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905. Since Korea’s independence from Japan after World War II, Dokdo has been South Korea’s most important and visible symbol of national sovereignty. Japan’s attempts to claim the islets have served as a very painful historical and emotional reminder of Korea’s past as a Japanese colony. There is no doubt that domestic political factors play a role in the stubborn actions of leaders from both countries, particularly at election time; however, they should bear in mind that the future strategic interests of both countries cannot be served with short-term public provocations.

For decades, Japan has insisted that the dispute should be resolved through the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but this is not likely to be a viable solution. Japan is aware that legal proceedings at the ICJ require South Korea’s consent under international law. Politicising the matter by taking it to the ICJ will likely only force South Korea to react with strengthened measures to further reinforce its de facto jurisdiction over the islets. Disrupting the status quo by politicising the issue in the international or domestic arena would not serve Japan’s intended purpose and would only further destabilise the region. Japan has clearly experienced this in its recent territorial dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, where the issue has been too politicised to maintain the status quo due to intense public provocation on both sides.

Countries like Australia and America, which have significant strategic interests in the Asia Pacific, should continue to voice concerns about the long-term impacts the tensions have on the entire region. Since the root of the dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima is embedded in Japanese colonial history and the role it played in Korea’s history, finding ways to overcome that legacy is an important first step toward promoting positive relations and finding a long-term solution. Just as Germany has had to play a leadership role in Europe by acknowledging and overcoming its past, Australia must help Japan address its past so that it can focus on playing a positive role in an East Asian alliance.

Jeffrey Choi is a PhD candidate at the School of Politics and International Relations, the Australian National University.

  1. South Korea and Japan: Disputes over the Dokdo/Takeshima islands
  2. Dokdo still limits Tokyo and Seoul’s strategic rapprochement
  3. Lee Myung Bak’s stunt over disputed islands

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The Dokdo/Takeshima dispute and its implications for Australia

Asean

ASEAN weathering the COVID-19 typhoon

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Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc addresses a special video conference with leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), on the coronavirus disease (COVID-19), in Hanoi 14 April, 2020 (Photo:Reuters/Manan Vatsyayana).

Author: Sandra Seno-Alday, Sydney University

The roughly 20 typhoons that hit Southeast Asia each year pale in comparison to the impact on the region of COVID-19 — a storm of a very different sort striking not just Southeast Asia but the world.

 

Just how badly is the COVID-19 typhoon thrashing the region? And what might the post-crisis recovery and reconstruction look like? To answer these questions, it is necessary to investigate the strengths and vulnerabilities of Southeast Asia’s pre-COVID-19 economic infrastructure.

Understanding the structure of the region’s economic house requires going back to 1967, when Southeast Asian countries decided to pledge friendship to one another under the ASEAN framework. While other integrated regions such as NAFTA and the European Union have aggressively broken down trade barriers and significantly boosted intra-regional trade, ASEAN regional economic integration has chugged along slower.

Southeast Asian countries have not viewed trade between each other as a top priority. The trade agreements in the region have been forged around suggestions for ASEAN countries to lower tariffs on intra-regional trade to within a certain range and across limited industries. This has lowered but not eliminated barriers to intra-regional trade. Consequently, a relatively significant share of Southeast Asian trade is with countries outside the region. This active extra-regional engagement has resulted in ASEAN countries’ successful integration into global value chain networks.

A historically outward-facing region, in 2010 around 75 per cent of Southeast Asian commodity imports and exports came from countries outside of ASEAN. This share of extra-regional trade nudged closer to 80 per cent in 2018. This indicates that ASEAN’s global value chain network embeddedness has deepened over time.

Around 40 per cent of ASEAN’s extra-regional trade is with the rest of Asia. From 2010 to 2018 Southeast Asian countries forged major trade relationships with four Asian countries: China, Japan, South Korea and India. Outside Asia, the United States is the region’s major trading partner. ASEAN’s trade focus on Asia’s largest markets is not surprising. Countries tend to establish trade relationships with large, geographically close, and culturally similar markets.

Fostering deep relationships with a few large markets, however, is a double-edged sword. While it has allowed ASEAN to benefit from integration in global value chains, it has also resulted in increased vulnerability to the shocks affecting its network connections.

ASEAN’s participation in global value chains has allowed it to transition from a net regional importer in 1990 to a net regional exporter in 2018. But the region’s deep embeddedness in a small and tightly-coupled network cluster of extra-regional global value chain partners has exposed it to disruption to any and all of its external partners. By contrast, ASEAN’s intra-regional trade network structure is much more loosely-coupled: a consequence of persistent intra-regional trade barriers and thus lower intra-regional trade intensity.

In the pre-COVID-19 period, ASEAN built for itself an economic house held up by just five extra-regional markets, while doing less to expand and diversify its intra-regional trade network. The data shows that ASEAN trade became increasingly concentrated in these few external markets between 2010 and 2018.

This dependence on a handful of markets does not bode well for risk and crisis management. All of the region’s major trading partners have been significantly affected by COVID-19 and this in turn is blowing the ASEAN economic house down.

What are the ways forward? The immediate task at hand is to get a better picture of the region’s position in global value chain networks and to get on top of managing its network risk exposure. Already there are red flags around the region’s food security arising from its position in food value chains. It is critical to look for ways to introduce flexibility into existing supply chains for greater agility in responding to crises.

It is also an opportune time for ASEAN to harness the technology transfer gains of global value chain participation and invest in innovation-driven diversification of products and markets. The region’s embeddedness in global value chain networks certainly places it in a strong position to readily access large export markets not just in Asia but also Europe and the Americas.

Over the longer term, ASEAN is faced with the question of whether it should seriously look…

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Tiger Trade Launches SGX Trading, Meeting Demand from Asian Investors

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Asean

Can Asia maintain growth with an ever ageing population ?

To boost productivity in the future, Asian governments will have to implement well-targeted structural reforms today.

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